Future Scenarios: Three Plausible Pathways (2025-2035)

The Central African Republic's trajectory over the next decade will be determined by whether the compounding crises of security, governance, and sovereignty can be addressed. Three scenarios emerge with distinct probabilities based on current indicators and historical patterns of state failure.

Scenario 1: Permanent Fragmentation (65% probability)

The most likely future is continuation and institutionalization of current territorial fragmentation. The CAR "state" persists juridically (UN seat, international recognition) while exercising minimal actual governance. Three parallel authority structures coexist indefinitely: government controlling Bangui and western corridors, MINUSCA providing security in protected zones, Wagner/Russia dominating mining areas, and armed groups controlling resource-rich east.

Key developments 2025-2035 under this scenario:

MINUSCA permanence: UN mission continues with periodic mandate renewals every 12-18 months. Troop levels fluctuate between 12,000-20,000 but never fully withdraw. Mission transforms from "temporary stabilization" to indefinite trusteeship without formal legal designation. Annual budgets of $900M-1.2B continue—nearly half CAR's GDP spent on foreign peacekeeping.

Wagner consolidation: Russian mercenaries expand control over gold and diamond zones. Formalize mining concessions through bilateral agreements with CAR government. Create de facto "Russian protectorate" in eastern provinces while maintaining fiction of CAR sovereignty. Population in Wagner zones receives some security (relative to armed group control) but zero democratic governance or resource revenue sharing.

Armed group adaptation: Militias evolve from rebel movements to permanent local governance structures. Develop taxation systems ("protection fees"), provide limited services where profitable, control smuggling routes. State fragmentation becomes institutionalized rather than crisis requiring resolution. Second generation grows up knowing only fragmented authority.

Economic stagnation: GDP per capita remains $300-500 range through 2035. Export revenues continue ($400-600M annually from diamonds/timber/gold) but generate minimal domestic benefit due to profit repatriation and corruption. Poverty rate stays 65-75%. The 96.6-minute TTI may actually worsen to 120-150 minutes as inflation outpaces any wage growth.

CFA franc continuation: No monetary independence gained. CAR remains locked in CEMAC with euro peg dictated externally. Inflation controlled (3-5% range) but no growth stimulus possible through monetary policy. Currency notes continue printing in France.

Scenario 1 Projected Outcomes (2035)

Indicator	2025 Baseline	2035 Projection
GDP per capita	$390	$420-480
Poverty rate	71%	65-75%
Sovereignty score	12/100	10-15/100
Territorial control	~40% government	35-45% government
Tin Tuna Index	96.6 minutes	120-150 minutes

Critical risks: Generational normalization of state failure—youth under 25 (60%+ of population) grow up knowing only fragmented authority, making state unity inconceivable rather than merely difficult. Resource depletion without development—diamond and gold fields exploited with zero infrastructure investment, leaving environmental devastation when deposits exhaust. Regional instability export—CAR's ungoverned spaces provide haven for jihadist groups, arms traffickers, and criminal networks destabilizing neighbors.

Scenario 2: Russian Protectorate Formation (25% probability)

Trigger event: Major security crisis (MINUSCA withdrawal, renewed civil war, or complete governance collapse) forces explicit choice: accept formal Russian protection or face total state disintegration. Wagner Group transforms from contractor to official defense force under bilateral treaty making protectorate status explicit rather than implicit.

Key developments:

Security consolidation: Wagner/Russia deploys 3,000-5,000 personnel with heavy weapons beyond current ~300-500 contractors. Defeats or co-opts major armed groups within 2-3 years through superior firepower and resource inducements. Establishes territorial control exceeding current government reach—potentially 60-70% of territory under Russian-backed forces.

Resource formalization: Mining concessions converted to long-term (20-50 year) exclusive contracts. Russian firms (potentially state-owned enterprises replacing Wagner brand) dominate diamond, gold, and timber sectors. Revenue-sharing heavily favors Russia (70-80% of profits) with CAR government receiving modest royalties insufficient for development but enough to sustain elite.

MINUSCA withdrawal: UN mission phases out 2027-2029 as Wagner assumes security role. Western countries pull funding, isolating CAR internationally but reducing external governance conditions. CAR becomes pariah state like Belarus—recognized juridically but politically isolated, dependent entirely on Russia/China axis.

Limited economic growth: GDP grows modestly (3-4% annually) from intensified extraction, not diversification. Infrastructure investment limited to mining zones and Bangui. Inequality increases as resource revenues concentrate in Bangui elite and Russian accounts while rural poverty persists.

Potential CFA franc exit: Russia may pressure CAR to leave CEMAC, adopt floating currency or partial dollarization. Gains nominal monetary independence but loses inflation stability. Short-term chaos (currency depreciation, capital flight, inflation spike to 15-25%) with uncertain long-term benefit given lack of institutional capacity for independent monetary policy.

End state 2030: CAR achieves territorial control and security but as explicit Russian protectorate. Wagner/Russian forces govern in practice, CAR government provides juridical legitimacy. Population moderately better off (security improved, some infrastructure) but sovereignty definitively surrendered. Becomes African test case for Russian quasi-colonial influence model.

Scenario 3: Radical Reconstruction (10% probability)

Trigger requirements: Multiple simultaneous breakthroughs required, making this scenario highly improbable: comprehensive peace agreement among all armed groups simultaneously; CFA franc exit or major CEMAC reform granting real autonomy; massive sustained development investment ($500M-1B annually for decade); regional stability in Chad/Sudan/DRC enabling focus on CAR; and transformational leadership generation committed to state-building emerging unexpectedly.

Probability assessment: Under 10% represents near-miracle scenario included for analytical completeness. Historical precedent absent—no failed state of CAR's severity has achieved comprehensive reconstruction without external colonization or partition. Somalia, Libya, Yemen remain fragmented decades after collapse, validating pessimism about CAR prospects.

Hypothetical pathway phases:

Phase 1 (2027-2029): National Reconciliation — Inclusive dialogue brings government, armed groups, civil society to negotiating table. Power-sharing creates federal structure recognizing regional autonomy. Disarmament program with credible reintegration (land, jobs, amnesty) persuades militia commanders to demobilize. Truth and reconciliation addresses atrocities without perpetuating cycles of revenge.

Phase 2 (2028-2030): Monetary Independence — CAR exits CEMAC, launches sovereign currency (New Central African Franc). Initial peg to dollar or currency basket provides stability during transition. Central bank rebuilt with technical assistance from non-CFA African nations (Ghana, Tanzania, Rwanda). Inflation spikes initially (15-25%) but stabilizes as institutions strengthen.

Phase 3 (2030-2040): Economic Diversification — Agriculture modernization through mechanization, irrigation, improved seeds. Domestic diamond cutting and gold refining captures value-added before export. Timber processing (furniture, construction materials) replaces raw log exports. Universal primary education, expanded secondary/vocational training builds human capital. All-weather road network, reliable electricity grid, digital connectivity transform business environment.

Optimistic projections 2040: GDP per capita $1,200-1,500 (vs $390 baseline). Poverty rate 35-40% (vs 71% baseline). Sovereignty score 65/100 (functional state). Tin Tuna Index 60-70 minutes (substantial purchasing power improvement). Government revenue 18-22% of GDP (functional tax system vs current ~10%).

Why this scenario is unlikely: Coordination problem insurmountable—requires hundreds of armed group commanders to simultaneously surrender power and weapons. No enforcement mechanism exists for peace agreements. Resource curse lock-in eliminates elite incentive for difficult diversification—why build factories when you can tax mines? Regional instability contagion from Chad, Sudan, DRC makes CAR stabilization nearly impossible while surrounded by conflict. Historical precedent completely absent for failed states achieving this level of reconstruction without external colonization.

Policy Recommendations: Harm Reduction Over Ideal Outcomes

Given Scenario 1 (Permanent Fragmentation) carries 65% probability and Scenario 2 (Russian Protectorate) 25%, policy recommendations must accept constrained options rather than pursue unrealistic transformation. The goal shifts from state-building to harm reduction—minimizing human suffering within structural constraints.

Recommendation 1: Formalize Federal Power-Sharing

Action: Abandon fiction of unified central state. Formalize existing fragmentation through constitutional amendment creating federal structure with provincial autonomy. Divide CAR into 6-8 provinces with autonomous budgets, security arrangements, and resource control.

Rationale: Territorial unification is not achievable in medium term (10-20 years). Attempting to impose central control generates perpetual conflict. Federal model recognizes reality—different regions have different governance (government, Wagner, armed groups, UN)—and creates framework for negotiation rather than combat.

Implementation: Central government retains foreign affairs, currency (for now), and border control. Provinces keep 70% of locally-generated revenue, contribute 30% to center for shared services. Provincial elections allow armed groups to transition to political parties, creating non-violent competition pathway. Revenue-sharing formula incentivizes local governance improvement rather than capital capture.

Outcome: Reduces conflict by eliminating winner-take-all central power competition. Allows localized governance experimentation—some provinces may achieve better outcomes than others, creating demonstration effects. Maintains juridical unity while accepting empirical fragmentation. Similar to Ethiopia's ethnic federalism (pre-2020 civil war) or Bosnia-Herzegovina's Dayton structure.

Recommendation 2: Transform MINUSCA Into Development Force

Action: Renegotiate UN mandate from pure "peacekeeping" to "state-building." Shift 30% of $1.1 billion annual MINUSCA budget from military operations to infrastructure projects. Convert peacekeepers into development corps: half maintain security, half build roads, schools, clinics.

Rationale: MINUSCA has operated since 2014 with minimal security progress. Military-only approach demonstrably failed. If UN mission will continue indefinitely regardless (mandate extensions guaranteed), redirect resources toward visible development that builds state legitimacy and provides peace dividend.

Concrete projects: All-weather road connecting Bangui to Cameroon border (critical trade route reducing landlocked isolation). Solar microgrids for 50 largest towns (electricity access currently under 15%). Mobile health clinics reaching areas without government services. Vocational training centers teaching construction, agriculture, mechanics—employable skills reducing armed group recruitment.

Outcome: Generates visible benefits justifying continued international presence. Reduces motivation to join armed groups by creating alternative livelihoods. Builds state capacity through infrastructure even if central government remains weak. More cost-effective than pure military approach that has failed for eleven years.

Recommendation 3: Negotiate Transparent Wagner Treaty

Action: Convert informal Wagner arrangements into transparent bilateral treaty with Russia. Establish joint governance committee overseeing mining operations, revenue distribution, environmental standards, and human rights monitoring.

Rationale: Wagner is not leaving—security dependency and mining profitability ensure continued presence. Current arrangement is completely opaque, unaccountable, and exploitative. Formalization allows CAR to negotiate better terms and create oversight mechanisms, however imperfect.

Treaty provisions: CAR receives 40% of mining profits (up from estimated current 10-15%). Environmental impact assessments required before new extraction. Local employment quotas: 70% of workers must be CAR nationals. Technology transfer requirements: train CAR engineers in mining techniques. Sunset clause: 20-year maximum, renegotiable at 10-year mark. Human rights monitoring: independent observers access Wagner-controlled zones.

Outcome: Increases state revenue from resources by 3-4x if enforced. Creates precedent for regulated foreign investment rather than pure extraction. Reduces but doesn't eliminate exploitation—pragmatic acceptance that CAR lacks leverage for ideal deal. Similar to resource contracts in other weak states (DRC, South Sudan) where imperfect oversight better than none.

Recommendation 4: Regional Food Self-Sufficiency Program

Action: Launch 10-year agricultural modernization targeting rice, cassava, and maize production to reduce import dependency. Combine with provincial food reserve system for crisis management.

Rationale: Agriculture is 43% of GDP but remains subsistence-level with massive untapped potential. Food imports drain scarce foreign exchange. Self-sufficiency would dramatically improve TTI (reducing from 96.6 minutes potentially to 50-60 minutes for staple protein) and reduce external vulnerability.

Program components: Mechanization through subsidized tractor pools managed provincially. Small-scale irrigation for dry-season cultivation. Improved seed varieties for higher yields. Agricultural extension services—advisors in every province. Provincial buying centers offering guaranteed prices, creating market access for smallholders. Grain storage silos preventing 30-40% post-harvest losses currently experienced.

Projected impact 2035: Rice production +150% (reduce imports by 60%). Cassava production +100% (staple food security). Rural incomes +40-60% (market access + better prices). TTI improvement: 96.6 minutes to 50-60 minutes for domestically-produced staple protein. Most achievable sovereignty gain—reduces external dependency while generating rural employment.

Recommendation 5: Managed CFA Franc Exit Strategy

Action: Begin confidential technical preparations for eventual CEMAC exit over 7-10 year timeline. Build central bank capacity, accumulate foreign exchange reserves, develop monetary policy expertise—even if exit never occurs, preparation creates negotiating leverage for substantive reforms.

Rationale: CFA franc provides inflation stability (4.1%) but eliminates all growth tools. CAR needs ability to devalue to boost competitiveness, expand money supply selectively, and adjust monetary policy to domestic conditions rather than Frankfurt's priorities. Remaining in CEMAC perpetuates stagnation and external dependence.

Phased approach: Years 1-3: Technical capacity building at BEAC representation, monetary policy staff training. Years 4-6: Foreign exchange reserve accumulation (target 6 months import cover minimum). Year 7: Issue parallel currency initially pegged 1:1 to XAF for stability testing. Years 8-10: Gradually widen exchange rate band, move toward managed float if conditions permit.

Critical challenge: CAR cannot exit unilaterally without severe disruption. Optimal approach: coordinate with other dissatisfied CEMAC members (potentially Cameroon, Chad) to collectively demand substantive reform or threaten coordinated exit. Collective action creates negotiating power individual weakness prevents.

Risks: Initial inflation spike (15-25%), currency speculation, capital flight. Requires strict capital controls, IMF technical support, and political will to withstand short-term pain for long-term autonomy. Given CAR's state weakness, premature exit could trigger currency collapse—hence 7-10 year preparation timeline and emphasis on using preparation as leverage for reform rather than necessarily executing exit.

Implementation Realities and Constraints

All five recommendations face severe political obstacles stemming from CAR's governance vacuum and competing foreign interests:

Policy Feasibility Assessment (2025-2030)

Recommendation	Primary Obstacle	Feasibility
Federal power-sharing	Bangui elite resistance (power dilution); armed groups demand too much	35% - Requires external mediation pressure
MINUSCA transformation	UN bureaucratic inertia; Security Council politics; mandate constraints	30% - Depends on major powers agreeing
Wagner treaty formalization	Russia has zero incentive to accept oversight or revenue sharing	20% - CAR has no leverage
Agricultural program	Funding ($200-300M needed); security enabling farmer return to land	50% - Most achievable if donor support secured
CFA franc exit preparation	France opposition; technical capacity lacking; CEMAC coordination difficult	25% - Long-term aspiration, not near-term reality

None of these recommendations can succeed without: sustained political will from CAR government (currently absent given governance vacuum); external financing minimum $500M-1B annually for decade from development partners (unlikely given state failure); regional stability in Chad/Sudan/DRC preventing conflict spillover (not current trajectory); and credible enforcement mechanisms for agreements (CAR lacks capacity, international community lacks commitment).

Realistic expectation: partial implementation of 1-2 recommendations with mixed results. Complete state reconstruction remains implausible absent external shock (major oil/mineral discovery attracting serious investment, or regional power like Nigeria deciding to invest heavily in CAR stabilization as strategic priority).

Final Assessment: The 96.6 Minute Illusion

The Central African Republic's 96.6-minute Tin Tuna Index—the best among UN46 countries analyzed—masks a reality of profound state failure where 71% live in poverty, 2 million are displaced, foreign forces outnumber and outgun national army, and sovereignty scores 12 out of 100.

This disconnect reveals the metric's fundamental limitation: TTI measures formal wage purchasing power for a tiny elite in government/aid sector formal employment, while the vast majority survive through subsistence agriculture, informal economy, or humanitarian assistance completely invisible to the calculation. For the 71% in poverty, the relevant economic reality is not how many minutes of minimum wage work buy canned tuna, but rather: no formal employment exists, no minimum wage protection applies, imported protein is unaffordable regardless of calculation, and survival depends on subsistence farming or aid when displacement prevents farming.

CAR demonstrates how single economic indicators can obscure rather than illuminate poverty. Favorable TTI coexists with catastrophic sovereignty failure, revealing that metrics must be contextualized within broader governance, security, and social realities. Numbers tell part of the story—context tells the rest.

The base case scenario (65% probability) envisions permanent fragmentation continuing through 2035: government controlling Bangui and west, MINUSCA indefinitely deployed, Wagner dominating mining zones, armed groups holding resource-rich east, and population trapped in 65-75% poverty with minimal state services. This outcome—deeply unsatisfactory but avoiding complete collapse—represents the most likely future absent extraordinary intervention.

For minimum-wage workers in formal employment, the TTI may actually worsen from 96.6 minutes to 120-150 minutes by 2035 as inflation outpaces any wage growth and food import costs rise. For the 71% majority outside formal economy, purchasing power remains catastrophically constrained regardless of formal metrics.

True sovereignty recovery—territorial integrity, monetary independence, resource control, fiscal capacity—requires 20-30 years of sustained effort, $10-15 billion in development investment, regional stability, and political will currently absent. Until these preconditions emerge, CAR will remain legally independent but empirically fragmented—a state that exists on UN membership rolls but barely functions on the ground.

Complete Methodology, Data Sources & Analytical Framework

Research Standards:

This report uses verified data from peer-reviewed sources, official government publications, international institutions with transparent methodologies, and investigative journalism from credible outlets. All claims traceable to specific sources with publication dates. Data from 2023-2025 prioritized; older data excluded to maintain currency.

Tin Tuna Index Methodology:

• Formula: (Retail Price of 170g Tuna ÷ Hourly Minimum Wage) × 60 minutes
• Wage Calculation: 35,000 XAF/month ÷ 173.33 hours/month = 201.92 XAF/hour
• Working Hours: 40 hours/week × 4.33 weeks = 173.33 hours/month
• Price Data: 250-400 XAF range in Bangui markets; midpoint 325 XAF used
• Result: (325 ÷ 201.92) × 60 = 96.6 minutes (1.61 hours)

Sovereignty Scorecard Methodology:

Five dimensions assessed on 0-20 scale: Territorial Control (government vs armed groups/foreign forces), Monetary Independence (CFA franc = 0 autonomy), Security Autonomy (MINUSCA/Wagner dependence), Resource Control (foreign mining firms/Wagner extraction), Fiscal Capacity (revenue collection ability). CAR scores: Territorial 4/20, Monetary 0/20, Security 2/20, Resource 3/20, Fiscal 3/20. Total: 12/100 (Failed State).

Primary Data Sources:

• Macroeconomic: IMF Central African Republic Country Reports 2024-2025; World Bank CAR Overview 2025; Trading Economics verified data
• Governance/Security: UN Security Council MINUSCA documentation; RAND Corporation Africa Corps assessment; Freedom House (where available); ACLED conflict data
• Resources/Trade: IPIS Research diamond sector analysis; Kimberley Process statistics; Lloyd's Bank Trade Portal; World Bank trade data
• CFA Franc: BEAC institutional data; CEMAC monetary documentation; Academic research on franc zone
• Population/Poverty: World Bank Development Indicators; UN population estimates; UNDP Human Development data where available

Data Limitations:

Multiple critical indicators lack verified 2024-2025 data: governance indices (TI CPI, RSF, Freedom House), life expectancy, literacy, child malnutrition, CAR-specific FX reserves (only CEMAC regional total available), Wagner payment terms (completely opaque). These absences reflect state failure where statistical collection has collapsed.

Scenario Analysis:

Three scenarios developed using historical trend analysis, expert institutional assessments, probabilistic modeling of variable interactions. Probabilities (Fragmentation 65%, Russian Protectorate 25%, Reconstruction 10%) reflect evidence-informed judgment, not mathematical certainty. Acknowledge inherent uncertainty in complex state failure dynamics.

Report Reference: CAR-2025-001

Date: October 2025

Institution: The State of the Mind Research Division, UN46 Series

Version: Complete Three-Part Analysis