Africa's 2026 Election Calendar (Verified Schedule)

At least 18 countries across Africa will hold national elections in 2026, spanning presidential, parliamentary, and general elections from January to December.

Country	Election Type	Date	Context
Benin	Parliamentary	11 January 2026	Narrowed opposition space
Uganda	General (Presidential & Parliamentary)	12 January 2026	Museveni 7th term bid, 40 years in power
Benin	Presidential	12 April 2026	Former democratic benchmark
Cape Verde	Parliamentary	April 2026	Stable democracy
Ethiopia	General	June 2026	Post-conflict reconstruction
Zambia	General	13 August 2026	IMF programme constraints
Morocco	General	September 2026	Monarchy framework
South Africa	Municipal (Local Government)	November 2026 to January 2027	Coalition governance
Gambia	Presidential	5 December 2026	Post-transition fragility
South Sudan	General	22 December 2026	Peace agreement implementation

IMF Programme Prevalence Among 2026 Election Countries

According to the IMF's Debt Sustainability Analysis framework for Low-Income Countries, all 54 African countries are IMF members, with many subject to debt sustainability assessments. ActionAid's 2023 report "Fifty Years of Failure: the IMF, Debt and Austerity in Africa" covering Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe found that 8 out of 10 countries have recently been advised to cut or freeze public sector wage bills.

According to research from the Institute for Security Studies, Africa's external debt has risen continuously since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, reversing the prior decade of decline achieved through World Bank and IMF debt relief programmes. Between 2009 and 2023, the external debt to GDP ratio rose from just under 13 percent to 25 percent. The debt servicing burden grew from 3 percent of government expenditure in 2009 to 10 percent by 2023.

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Case Study: Zambia's Constrained Cycle

Zambia exemplifies the pattern. The country holds general elections on 13 August 2026, midway through an IMF Extended Credit Facility programme approved in August 2022 for $1.3 billion, later augmented to $1.7 billion in 2024. The 38-month programme runs through April 2025, with review mechanisms extending influence through 2026.

According to the IMF's Fourth Review of Zambia's ECF Arrangement completed in December 2024, the programme requires large, front-loaded, and sustained fiscal consolidation. The fiscal deficit must decline from 6 percent of GDP at the beginning of 2022 to a fiscal surplus of 3.2 percent of GDP in 2025. The end-June 2024 primary surplus reached 3.4 percent of GDP, well above the programme target. Despite the consolidation, social spending targets were missed.

The IMF Executive Board emphasized the need for sustained budget discipline ahead of the 2026 elections, according to the IMF's Fifth Review completed in August 2025. Real GDP growth is projected at 5.8 percent in 2025 on the back of continued recovery in agricultural production following a historic drought and strong performance in mining and services. However, Zambia's public debt is assessed as sustainable but the country remains at high risk of overall and external debt distress.

According to Tricontinental Institute analysis, the IMF required the Zambian government to reduce funding to the highly successful Farm Input Support Programme from 3 percent of GDP at the beginning of 2022 to 1 percent of GDP by 2025. This decision is argued to be largely responsible for the hunger crisis that enveloped Zambia in 2024. Revenue increases were to be borne largely by the poor through higher taxes on wages and a reduction in the number of goods that had been zero rated for value added tax purposes.

Whoever wins Zambia's August 2026 election inherits these parameters. Deviation triggers programme suspension. Programme suspension triggers financing withdrawal. Financing withdrawal triggers currency crisis. The policy envelope is predetermined. Elections allocate administrative authority within a fixed framework.

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Uganda: Elections Under Long Incumbency

Uganda's general election on 12 January 2026 kicks off Africa's 2026 election calendar, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is seeking his seventh term in office. He and his National Resistance Movement party are running on the campaign theme of "Protecting the Gains: Making a Qualitative Leap into High Middle Income Status." This election cycle marks the 40th anniversary of the former revolutionary military leader's tenure in power, the third longest on the continent.

The 81-year-old Museveni has extended his time in office by eliminating previously established term limits in 2005 and 2017, according to the Africa Center. Museveni's campaign is also shadowed by the increasingly prominent role played by his son, 51-year-old Muhoozi Kainerugaba. Now the Chief of Defense Forces following a series of rapid promotions, Kainerugaba is widely viewed as being groomed for the presidency as part of a carefully orchestrated hereditary succession.

As in the 2021 election, when the opposition faced up to 3,000 abductions and 54 fatalities plus 18 who remain unaccounted for, the 2026 election process has been characterized by intimidation and violence directed against the opposition. Hundreds of opposition supporters have been detained, and opposition rallies often face active disruption, including roadblocks, arbitrary arrests, tear gassing, and the use of water cannons against supporters by police. The leading opposition candidate, Bobi Wine of the National Unity Party, has likened the campaign to a war zone.

In 2021, rather than reporting electoral results by each polling station as required by law, the Electoral Commission announced results by region. This limited the scope for validating these results and created widespread skepticism around the announced tally of a Museveni victory with 58 percent of the vote in the first round. Opposition party members of parliament now collectively control roughly 100 seats out of the 556 seat legislative body.

Core economic and security policies remain firmly anchored regardless of outcome. Uganda's fiscal frameworks, debt structures, and external financing relationships provide continuity beyond electoral cycles.

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Why Continuity Wins

Continuity persists not because voters are indifferent, but because deviation is risky. Fragile currencies, high debt service costs, volatile food prices, and selective capital access constrain all governing coalitions. The Gambia reduced its debt to GDP ratio from over 120 percent in 2017 to 74 percent at the end of 2024, supported by regular debt sustainability assessments and prudent fiscal management, according to the African Development Bank. Sierra Leone lowered inflation from 52 percent in late 2023 to around 7.5 percent in April 2025 through economic reforms including transparency around public sector debt and clearing debt arrears.

Yet these improvements occurred within IMF programme frameworks that prescribe narrow policy corridors. Gambia's December 2026 presidential election and future Sierra Leone contests occur within debt sustainability constraints that limit fiscal maneuverability regardless of who wins.

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Institutions That Outlast Ballots

Central banks, debt offices, security establishments, and international agreements anchor policy frameworks beyond electoral cycles. In Benin, once a democratic benchmark according to analysis of African elections, recent electoral reforms have narrowed opposition space, producing orderly but increasingly non-competitive contests. The country holds parliamentary elections on 11 January 2026 and presidential elections on 12 April 2026. Stability is preserved institutionally rather than pluralistically. Economic policy parameters remain anchored to debt sustainability frameworks and external financing relationships that transcend political turnover.

Ethiopia holds general elections in June 2026 amid ongoing debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework. Cape Verde holds parliamentary elections in April 2026 and presidential elections in October 2026 within a stable democratic framework but constrained fiscal space. Morocco holds general elections in September 2026 within a monarchy framework where economic policy continuity is structurally embedded.

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Citizens Notice the Gap

Voters increasingly distinguish between participation and influence. When material conditions remain unchanged despite electoral turnover, belief erodes even as procedures endure. In Uganda, faith leaders under the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda called for measures to ensure security and transparency on November 25, 2025, according to the Africa Center. Yet the institutional architecture preserving policy continuity operates beyond the reach of electoral contestation.

Elections without change preserve order in the short term. Over time, however, the gap between procedural democracy and lived outcomes accumulates pressure rather than resolution. The question is not whether Africa votes in 2026. The question is what voting is permitted to change.

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What the 2026 Elections Actually Represent

Africa's 2026 elections do not take place on a uniform political field. They occur across states at sharply different stages of institutional maturity, security consolidation, and civic expectation. In Somalia, elections signify incremental state reconstruction after decades of collapse and insurgency. In Uganda, elections unfold within a long-standing incumbency framework where political stability is high but political mobility is constrained. In Benin, orderly but non-competitive contests reflect narrowed opposition space. In Gambia, elections follow a genuine political opening yet fiscal dependency and institutional rebuilding limit the scope for rapid policy departure. In Zambia and Ethiopia, leadership transitions occur within G20 Common Framework debt restructuring processes that constrain fiscal discretion.

Across this varied landscape, a common pattern emerges. Elections confer authority. They manage succession. They renew governing coalitions. What they rarely do is reopen the fundamental bargains around debt, fiscal policy, monetary frameworks, or structural adjustment. Those bargains are negotiated elsewhere, in debt sustainability assessments, IMF programme reviews, and creditor committee meetings. By the time ballots are cast, the economic settlement is already struck.

Africa's ballots in 2026 will matter. But unless something beyond leadership is permitted to change, elections will continue to manage legitimacy rather than transform outcomes. The vote moves. The system holds. And the gap between procedural democracy and economic sovereignty widens with each cycle that validates authority without reopening constraint.