Soft Power, Hard Edges

Influence now travels through culture, currency, and connectivity rather than confrontation.

BRICS does not openly confront Western dominance. Instead, it builds parallel infrastructure that reduces dependence without requiring explicit alignment against the West. The expansion from five founding members to ten full members plus thirteen partner countries demonstrates a calculated strategy: create corridors that offer alternatives, not ultimatums.

This is not a monolithic bloc. Members include democracies and authoritarian regimes, oil exporters and importers, regional rivals and strategic competitors. Yet the structure persists because BRICS operates as what one analysis termed a "corridor building institution" rather than an alliance demanding deep integration.

Cultural Infrastructure: The Invisible Layer

Before the ports and pipelines, before the payment systems and currency swaps, China established a foundation of cultural presence that shapes how its infrastructure investments are perceived across the Global South.

Joshua Nederhood of Development Reimagined observed that these institutes "tend to flourish in countries that value China's culture more than its investments." This sequence matters. Cultural familiarity precedes economic transactions, creating cognitive infrastructure before physical infrastructure.

The strategic value becomes clear in polling data. Gallup reported in April 2024 that China's approval ratings were climbing in Africa while US ratings dipped. Afrobarometer found public opinion of China "positively glowing" in many African countries. This soft power foundation makes harder infrastructure projects politically palatable to domestic audiences who might otherwise view them with suspicion.

The comparison with Western media presence is stark. The BBC maintains what one analysis called a "large footprint" based on colonial legacy, but its influence has plateaued. Chinese state-backed media has grown exponentially precisely as Western presence remains static. Xinhua provides content free of charge. CGTN trains local journalists. The model inverts traditional media economics: rather than extracting revenue, China subsidizes content production to shape narratives.

This cultural layer creates what development scholars call "cognitive infrastructure" — frameworks of understanding that precede economic transactions. When Chinese companies bid on infrastructure contracts, they operate in an information environment partially shaped by Chinese media institutions. When BRICS announces new initiatives, the story reaches African audiences through channels influenced by years of content-sharing agreements and journalist training programs.

Why Countries Join: The Strategic Calculations

The appeal of BRICS varies dramatically by member. Each brings distinct motivations that reveal what the bloc offers beyond rhetoric about multipolarity.

Ethiopia's calculation illustrates a pattern: BRICS membership provides access to development finance without the governance conditionality that accompanies Western lending. For a country building industrial capacity, the New Development Bank's infrastructure focus aligns with domestic priorities in ways that structural adjustment programs do not.

The UAE's membership signals something different: this is not purely a developing country bloc. With its sophisticated financial infrastructure and ambitions as a global hub, the UAE sees BRICS as a platform for diversification away from exclusive Western orientation. The Emirates positions itself as the bridge between Global South development finance and established financial markets.

Indonesia's approach demonstrates the bloc's flexibility. Prabowo explicitly views other BRICS members as competitors while simultaneously joining the group. This reveals the low-integration model: members need not align on economic interests or abandon competitive relationships. They require only sufficient common interest in creating alternatives to Western-dominated institutions.

Iran's membership illustrates the bloc's most contested dimension. For a country under comprehensive Western sanctions, BRICS provides an economic lifeline that Western institutions actively deny. Khamenei's framing centers dollar dependence as the core vulnerability. BRICS offers payment alternatives, currency swap arrangements, and trade relationships that bypass sanctioned channels.

The Conditionality Differential: Speed vs Structure

Understanding BRICS appeal requires examining what it does not require. The New Development Bank operates under fundamentally different principles than the Bretton Woods institutions, and these differences shape member calculations.

The contrast illuminates why countries frustrated by IMF conditionality find NDB appealing. When Zambia faces elections in August 2026 while implementing an IMF program requiring a swing from 6% deficit to 3.2% surplus, the political cost of structural adjustment becomes tangible. The NDB offers an alternative that emphasizes project bankability over institutional restructuring.

This is not to claim the NDB imposes no standards. Projects must demonstrate economic feasibility. The 62.5% approval rate indicates gatekeeping based on project quality. But the political economy differs fundamentally: the NDB does not require dismantling domestic social programs or restructuring governance systems as preconditions for infrastructure finance.

The Debt Trap Debate: Competing Narratives

Western critics frame Chinese lending through the prism of "debt trap diplomacy," citing Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port as the paradigmatic case. In 2017, unable to service Chinese debt, Sri Lanka leased the port to China for 99 years. This narrative portrays deliberate engineering: unsustainable lending designed to force asset seizures.

The counter-narrative emphasizes context that complicates simplistic interpretations. Sri Lanka's debt crisis involved multiple creditors, not just China. The Hambantota Port was economically questionable from conception — feasibility issues preceded debt distress. The 99-year lease follows common international port management practice. Sri Lanka retains sovereignty; this is asset monetization, not seizure.

Academic research on Chinese lending terms reveals interest rates often at 2-3% (concessional), with repayment periods of 15-20 years and grace periods of 5+ years. Commercial lending to Africa typically carries higher rates with shorter maturities — the "Africa premium" that makes Chinese financing comparatively attractive despite concerns about transparency.

The analytical balance requires acknowledging legitimate concerns while contextualizing them. Chinese lending transparency could improve. Some projects carry questionable economic returns. Debt sustainability varies dramatically by borrower. But the alternative to Chinese credit is often no credit at all, or commercial lending on worse terms. Western institutions created their own debt crises through the structural adjustment era of the 1980s-1990s, requiring HIPC and MDRI initiatives to write off unsustainable debt.

The NDB's relatively modest scale — tens of billions in cumulative approvals versus hundreds of billions from World Bank and Asian Development Bank — limits over-exposure risk. This is not yet a replacement for Bretton Woods institutions. Rather, it operates as what Global Panorama termed "corridor building" infrastructure, creating options and reducing Western monopoly on development finance.

Digital Silk Road: Technology as Infrastructure

The most durable dependency emerges not from debt but from technology architecture. Once network infrastructure embeds specific standards, switching costs create decades-long lock-in.

Huawei's 5G dominance in the Global South creates infrastructure dependencies that outlast any single loan agreement. Network architecture determines data routing, maintenance contracts, upgrade pathways, and technology standards for decades. The Middle East illustrates this dynamic: UAE's du partnered with Huawei to build "the world's first 5.5G Innovation Center," while Saudi Arabia's NEOM project deploys 5G-powered smart city infrastructure with Chinese technology partners.

The cloud infrastructure expansion compounds these dependencies. Alibaba Cloud operates across Southeast Asia and the Middle East, providing alternatives to Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure. Huawei Cloud's 34 regions and 101 availability zones create data center infrastructure that mirrors Western cloud providers' geographic distribution while operating under different data governance frameworks.

This raises sovereignty paradoxes. Global South countries adopt Chinese technology partly to assert "cyber sovereignty" — our data, our rules — against Western tech dominance. Yet Chinese frameworks impose their own requirements: data localization, state access provisions, different privacy standards than GDPR. The technology transfer is incomplete; core technology remains Chinese-controlled, ensuring long-term dependency even as local manufacturing facilities and technician training programs provide partial localization.

Western responses — Huawei bans in US/UK/Australia, "Clean Network" initiatives — have limited success in the Global South where cost and speed imperatives dominate security concerns. The infrastructure gap demands solutions now, not after lengthy procurement processes that scrutinize supply chain security. This urgency, more than ideology, drives technology choices that will shape information architecture for decades.

Energy Dominance: The Resource Leverage

The overlap between BRICS+ and OPEC membership creates potential coordination that extends beyond typical commodity cartel dynamics. This is about more than oil pricing; it is about who controls energy infrastructure, who sets transition pathways, and whose currencies denominate energy trade.

If Saudi Arabia formalizes BRICS membership, the bloc would encompass a staggering share of global energy production. This creates pricing power, but more significantly, it creates leverage over energy infrastructure and currency arrangements. Russia's 2024 production of 10.5 million barrels per day flows predominantly to BRICS+ countries, demonstrating how sanctions reshape energy geography without destroying production capacity.

The paradox: major fossil fuel producers (Russia, Iran, UAE, Saudi if joined) simultaneously push renewable energy transitions. The NDB pledged 60% of lending to renewable energy projects in its first five years. Indonesia's President Prabowo targets 100% renewable energy within ten years. China dominates solar panel manufacturing, battery production, and EV technology.

This dual positioning — leadership in both fossil fuels AND renewables — creates strategic optionality. BRICS+ members can shape energy transition timelines, technology standards, and financing mechanisms while maintaining revenue from conventional energy. They control the resource base for green technology (critical minerals, rare earths) while dominating legacy energy production.

Energy as political leverage became undeniable during the Ukraine war. Europe's gas dependency on Russia translated directly into constraints on policy options. SWIFT exclusion combined with energy weapon deployment forced Europe into painful, expensive alternative procurement. The lesson resonates throughout BRICS+: energy infrastructure creates political space for maneuver that financial sanctions cannot easily eliminate.

Internal Contradictions: Why It Hasn't Collapsed

BRICS contains fault lines that would fracture most alliances. India and China maintain tense borders with ongoing military buildups following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash that killed 20 Indian soldiers. Democracies (Brazil, India, South Africa) partner with authoritarian regimes (China, Russia, Iran, Egypt, UAE, Ethiopia). Iran and UAE operate as regional rivals. Members compete for resources, influence, and markets while nominally cooperating.

India's Ambassador D. Bala Venkatesh Varma stated bluntly: "India's stance in BRICS is pro-India. Claiming that BRICS is dominated by China is an exaggeration." This framing reveals the operational logic: members pursue national interests through BRICS mechanisms without surrendering sovereignty to collective decision-making.

The bloc persists precisely because it demands so little integration. There is no monetary union, no fiscal policy coordination, no common foreign policy. Members need not align on Ukraine (Brazil neutral, Russia belligerent), Gaza (Iran directly involved, UAE has Abraham Accords with Israel), or democracy promotion (fundamental values conflict).

What unites members is negative cohesion: shared opposition to Western dominance rather than shared vision of alternatives. This lowest common denominator proves surprisingly durable. Economic necessity reinforces coordination: China-Russia trade hit $244.8 billion in 2024, China-Brazil trade involves 28% of Brazilian exports. Development finance gaps that Western institutions won't fill create demand for NDB lending regardless of geopolitical tensions.

The institutional design facilitates this flexibility. Equal voting prevents Chinese hegemony even as China contributes 70% of BRICS GDP. The 55% minimum for founding members ensures no single actor dominates. Opt-in arrangements for specific initiatives (BRICS Pay, currency swaps, infrastructure projects) allow selective participation without requiring universal alignment.

The test is not whether BRICS displaces the dollar or rivals the G7. The test is whether it provides enough room for maneuver that middle powers can navigate geopolitical pressure without full alignment to either Western or Chinese spheres. So far, the answer is yes.

De-Dollarization Infrastructure

The New Development Bank approved $39 billion in cumulative projects through 2024, dispersing $28 billion across 92 projects in six member countries. This represents a 62.5% approval rate — higher than many anticipated given the NDB's emphasis on rapid response.

The NDB's local currency financing represents more than technical adjustment. Borrowing in local currencies reduces dollar exposure on sovereign balance sheets, creating what Global Panorama termed a "practical hedge against the US interest-rate cycle and sanctions risk." When Russia faced SWIFT exclusion and $25 billion in lost transactions in the first half of 2022, countries watching recognized the vulnerability of dollar-dependent systems.

Russian Foreign Minister Siluanov proposed housing a transaction hub within the NDB structure, discussed at both 2024 and 2025 summits. This would create payment messaging infrastructure that bypasses SWIFT's oversight by G10 central banks and the ECB. The system need not replace SWIFT to succeed; it must only provide sufficient alternative capacity that sanctions threats lose effectiveness.

Gold accumulation reinforces this infrastructure. Central banks purchased 1,045 metric tons in 2024, marking the third consecutive year exceeding 1,000 tons. Poland led with 90 tons, but the trend spans BRICS members seeking tangible reserves that cannot be frozen by Western sanctions as dollar-denominated assets can be.

These figures reveal the scale of entrenchment BRICS confronts. The dollar's dominance rests on network effects, institutional inertia, and the depth of US financial markets. BRICS infrastructure cannot displace this system in any plausible timeline. But it can create corridors that reduce monopoly power at the margins.

Different Conditions, Different Appeal

The NDB distinguishes itself through governance structure as much as lending terms. Equal shareholding and voting contrasts with IMF/World Bank weighted systems that concentrate power with the United States and Europe. The original BRICS five cannot fall below 55% voting power, currently exceeding 90%, ensuring founding members control without any single actor dominating.

The bank uses local environmental and social standards rather than imposing uniform frameworks. This respects sovereignty in ways Western institutions traditionally have not. Projects must demonstrate economic viability, but the NDB avoids policy conditionality that requires restructuring domestic governance or dismantling social programs.

Thailand framed BRICS membership as boosting "prospects as international economic policy makers." Ethiopia described it as a platform "where interests and priorities may be respected." These formulations emphasize agency and dignity alongside material benefits. Countries frustrated by decades of structural adjustment programs find appeal in institutions that separate infrastructure finance from domestic policy dictates.

The Hard Edges Beneath Soft Power

Yet BRICS infrastructure creates its own constraints. Currency swap arrangements can become dependencies when repeated use creates expectation of renewal. Infrastructure built to Chinese standards locks in maintenance contracts and upgrade pathways controlled by Chinese firms. Local currency lending still requires repayment; default consequences differ in mechanism but not necessarily in severity from dollar-denominated debt.

Political leverage accompanies economic engagement. BRICS members expect diplomatic alignment on UN votes, recognition of territorial claims, and support for positions on human rights and sovereignty. The difference from Western conditionality is not the absence of expectations but their framing around sovereignty and non-interference rather than institutional reform and governance standards.

The technology dependencies outlined earlier create the most durable constraints. Once 5G infrastructure embeds Huawei standards, switching costs prevent easy migration to alternatives. Smart city systems built with Chinese surveillance technology create data flows and monitoring capabilities that persist regardless of changing political winds. Cloud infrastructure determines where data resides and under whose jurisdiction it falls.

India's 2026 Presidency: The Test Ahead

Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced at the July 2025 Rio summit that India would give BRICS "a new form" during its 2026 presidency. What this means remains deliberately ambiguous, but India's balancing act reveals the bloc's tensions.

India's challenge: maintain strategic autonomy while countering Chinese dominance within BRICS, keep Western relationships functional through Quad and US partnership, use BRICS for economic benefits without full geopolitical alignment. This triangulation strategy reflects broader BRICS dynamics — members navigate between major powers rather than choosing sides.

Geopolitical flashpoints will test coherence. Trump's November 2024 threat of 100% tariffs if BRICS creates a currency, followed by July 2025 warnings of additional 10% tariffs for "anti-American policies," creates pressure. Russian spokesperson Peskov responded that force will "strengthen the trend" toward national currencies, but actual implementation will reveal whether members risk US economic retaliation.

Ukraine continues dividing the bloc. Russia's belligerence conflicts with Brazil's neutrality and India's balancing act between Russian weapons dependence and Western partnerships. Gaza creates similar divisions: Iran directly involved, UAE has Abraham Accords with Israel, other members maintain varying positions. How long can BRICS avoid fracturing over conflicts where members have opposed interests?

The 2026 summit will test whether Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin attend, having both skipped Rio in 2025. Their absence would signal either disengagement or confidence that BRICS operates effectively without requiring leader-level attendance. Their presence would demonstrate commitment but might complicate India's effort to position BRICS as more multi-polar and less China-centric.

Hegemony Via Intermediation

BRICS does not seek to replace Western institutions wholesale. It builds parallel infrastructure that offers alternatives without demanding exclusive loyalty. The New Development Bank operates alongside the World Bank. BRICS Pay would supplement rather than supplant SWIFT. Currency swaps reduce dollar dependence at the margin without eliminating dollar use.

This incremental approach proves more sustainable than revolutionary ambitions. Members maintain relationships with Western institutions while developing BRICS alternatives. They hedge rather than choose. The result is not a bipolar world but a multipolar system where middle powers navigate between competing centers of influence.

The real contest is not over institutions themselves but over who certifies risk, who sets templates, and whose disputes get priority treatment. This is hegemony via intermediation — not commanding allegiance through military might or ideological appeal, but becoming the indispensable intermediary through which resources flow and transactions clear.

Western institutions built this model through post-World War II architecture. The Bretton Woods system, SWIFT messaging, dollar reserves, World Bank lending — these created intermediation that made the United States central to global economic flows regardless of individual transaction participants. BRICS attempts to replicate this positioning for a different set of members with different governance principles.

Success does not require displacing the dollar or outcompeting Western development banks in lending volume. Success requires creating sufficient alternative capacity that threats of exclusion lose effectiveness, that sanctions become negotiable rather than automatic, that middle powers have genuine options when choosing development partners.

The infrastructure outlined — cultural foundations through Confucius Institutes and state media, payment systems through BRICS Pay and currency swaps, development finance through NDB, technology architecture through 5G and cloud systems, energy coordination through OPEC+ overlap — constitutes the physical substrate of this intermediation.

Whether it succeeds depends less on BRICS coherence than on Western responses. If Western institutions adapt by reducing conditionality, accelerating lending, and respecting sovereignty, BRICS appeal diminishes. If they maintain structures that many Global South countries experience as extractive or disrespectful, BRICS alternatives become more attractive regardless of their imperfections.

The competition, ultimately, is not between ideologies but between operational models. Which approach delivers infrastructure faster? Which respects sovereignty more? Which creates dependencies that constrain or opportunities that expand? These pragmatic questions, more than rhetorical commitments to multipolarity or liberal internationalism, will determine whether BRICS becomes central to global economic architecture or remains a second-tier alternative for countries with no better options.