Why a calendar matters more than a forecast
Economic forecasts flatten time. "Growth at 4.2%" sounds smooth, almost tranquil. Reality is lumpy. It arrives as election days, IMF board meetings, coupon payments, climate summits, tariff decisions, ratings reviews and coup attempts that happen on very specific weeks.
For decision-makers in and around the Global South, 2026 is not a single "macro outlook". It is a sequence of deadlines: debt roll-overs in March, a presidential election in April, a climate summit in November, a BRICS gathering with sanctions on the agenda, a ratings committee sitting on a Friday afternoon. Miss the timing and you misread the risk.
This calendar is designed as a working tool, not a prediction. It organises 2026 into four types of date: political turning points (elections, constitutional changes, high-stakes protests); debt and financing windows (known maturity "walls", likely IMF decisions, and rating-sensitive milestones); system-level summits (G20, BRICS, COP, WTO, regional blocs); and structural transitions (new trade regimes, infrastructure switch-ons, regulatory changes that permanently alter incentives). Dates are as firm as current information allows. Where timetables are not yet formally fixed, we indicate that they are expected or approximate, and treat them as watch windows rather than certainties.
How to read this calendar
Use it with a country list. For our 20 core economies (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, India, China, Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE and Kazakhstan) this calendar flags the main cluster points where several countries face pressure at once. Watch clusters, not single dates. A Brazilian election in October, a big sovereign maturity in November, and a COP summit in late November can interact. Market liquidity, political bandwidth and international attention are finite. Treat it as a risk heatmap in time: Q1 and Q2 are particularly dense for African politics and IMF reviews; Q4 concentrates climate negotiations and electoral decisions.
All data below is drawn from public election timetables, multilateral calendars, IMF programme documents, academic research on sovereign debt and climate risk, and official announcements as of December 2025.
Q1 2026: Opening moves
January brings both budget season and early votes. Uganda is scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in January 2026, with Kampala's long-serving incumbent seeking another term against a backdrop of youth discontent, high debt burden and tightening civic space. Benin's parliamentary elections on 11 January precede the presidential vote and act as an early barometer of opposition strength after years of political narrowing. These polls matter beyond their immediate borders: Uganda's median age of approximately 16 years creates one of the world's youngest electorates, while Benin's result will influence investor perceptions of governance risk across francophone West Africa.
Budget cycles in Nigeria, South Africa, India and Pakistan produce the first hard numbers on how governments intend to balance higher debt service with social spending and capital expenditure. In several cases, 2026 budgets will be the first to fully reflect post-2020 debt restructurings and subsidy reforms. January's documents are often more revealing than speeches. For lenders and investors, this is where 2025 promises become line items: fuel subsidies cut (or not), capital spending maintained (or not), tax hikes pushed through or delayed. Nigeria, carrying external debt exceeding $40 billion and with government revenues heavily dependent on oil (where empirical research shows oil-price shocks can explain approximately 22 percent of revenue variation), faces particularly acute trade-offs between servicing obligations and maintaining subsidies that have historically absorbed over 2 percent of GDP.
February brings ratings and rollover nerves. Sovereign rating reviews for a string of frontier issuers (Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Pakistan and others) will cluster in late Q1 and early Q2 as agencies update their views on post-restructuring performance and fiscal consolidation. Research evidence suggests that rating downgrades in emerging markets typically shift the lower tail of GDP growth down by approximately 2.95 percentage points over the subsequent four quarters, while reducing mean growth by 1.1 percentage points. More importantly, downgrades tend to trigger market access loss for one to two years and push sovereign bond spreads significantly wider, raising borrowing costs precisely when countries need to refinance maturing obligations.
Kenya, having successfully bought back $579 million of its $900 million May 2027 Eurobond in February 2025, faces approximately $321 million in remaining principal payments. The Central Bank of Kenya ruled out returning to international capital markets in 2025 due to tightening global financial conditions, indicating the earliest return would be 2026. Whether that window opens in Q2 or later depends substantially on investor appetite and Kenya's IMF programme status. A failed IMF review or unexpected rating downgrade could close market access entirely through 2026, forcing reliance on bilateral lenders or domestic borrowing at higher cost.
Several African and Asian sovereigns face sizeable coupon payments or bullet maturities in 2026 to 2027, with first serious market tests arriving in February to March as they attempt fresh issuance or liability-management operations in still-tight global conditions. Historical evidence on sovereign debt restructurings suggests that pre-emptive exchanges (before payment default) typically take one to three years to complete, while more complex post-default cases can stretch five to ten years. Creditors in such restructurings face average haircuts of approximately 45 percent in present-value terms, though actual outcomes vary widely depending on crisis severity and creditor composition. By the end of February, markets will have an early answer to a central question: do investors still have appetite for frontier debt at reasonable yields, or will IMF programmes and bilateral lenders remain the only realistic funding source for many issuers?
March offers trade and monetary signposts. WTO and regional trade negotiations on African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Phase 2 (services and intellectual property) and Asian regional integration will likely record progress benchmarks around ministerial meetings in Q1 to Q2. Monetary policy pivots in key emerging markets follow: if global inflation has cooled as expected, several central banks (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia, India) may be deeper into rate-cut cycles by March, easing domestic financial conditions but testing currencies. March is the first point at which 2026 can look meaningfully different from 2024 to 2025: either rate cuts are underway and debt becomes more manageable, or inflation proves sticky and monetary authorities stay cautious. For countries like Turkey, where inflation has historically oscillated between single and triple digits, the March trajectory will set expectations for the entire year.
Q2 2026: The debt and IMF corridor
April opens with political and institutional pressure clustering across a critical two-week window. On 12 April, Benin holds its presidential election, a test of whether the country's conservative political turn can be reversed. Though small in absolute GDP terms (approximately $18 billion), Benin's poll serves as a bellwether for West African political liberalism and investor perceptions of governance risk across the region. The election falls within days of the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings (13 to 18 April 2026), where finance ministers from across the Global South will negotiate the year's financing terms with multilateral lenders.
The proximity matters. If Benin's election triggers political instability or contested results in the week before Spring Meetings, it could colour broader discussions about West African programme lending. Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso, all with their own political pressures, will be watching closely. For markets, the April cluster provides an early signal: can frontier democracies manage electoral transitions while maintaining IMF programme discipline? The answer will influence investor appetite for the region's sovereigns through the rest of 2026.
Meanwhile, Brazil positions itself for October's general election with early-year fiscal manoeuvres. Brasília's 2026 budget, typically finalised in the first half of the year, will set the tone for the entire Latin American risk complex. The government faces a choice: lean on spending restraint and new taxes to satisfy markets, or employ creative accounting to preserve social programmes and maintain political support ahead of the polls. Brazil's decisions in Q2 will ripple through Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and the broader Mercosur area, particularly for trade policy and regional energy integration. With Brazil's GDP at approximately $2.1 trillion, representing over 40 percent of South America's economy, its fiscal choices effectively anchor expectations for emerging market credit across the continent.
May to June brings what market participants call "IMF Board congestion," the period when multiple high-stakes programme reviews collide on the Fund's calendar. Egypt, Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia all face reviews across Q2 and Q3, depending on performance and negotiations. Each review unlocks or delays disbursements that can trigger parallel World Bank and bilateral flows, making the IMF Board calendar almost as important as domestic legislative timetables.
Egypt's case illustrates the stakes. The country's $8 billion Extended Fund Facility, expanded to approximately $9.2 billion including the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, runs through October 2026. As of December 2025, Egypt had received roughly $3.5 billion. The IMF combined the 5th and 6th reviews into a single assessment, potentially unlocking $2.5 billion if structural benchmarks are met. However, Egypt failed to reach half of its structural benchmarks in the previous two reviews, a pattern consistent with broader research showing that over-ambitious conditionality often leads to lower completion rates and programme failure. The missing benchmarks centre on state asset divestment and energy sector reforms, both politically sensitive when Egypt's external debt exceeds $150 billion and interest payments consume approximately 60 percent of government expenditure. If the combined review fails or is further delayed, Egypt faces a financing gap of approximately $2.5 billion precisely when its external debt service obligations peak in late 2026.
Pakistan's situation runs in parallel. The country's $7 billion Extended Fund Facility, approved in September 2024 and running 37 months through October 2027, completed its second review on 8 December 2025, unlocking $1.2 billion (comprising $1 billion under the EFF and $200 million under the separate Resilience and Sustainability Facility). Total disbursements under both programmes now stand at approximately $3.3 billion. The next review is scheduled for the second half of 2026, likely in Q3. Pakistan's reserves, rebuilt from a crisis low of under $4 billion in mid-2023 to approximately $14 billion by late 2025, provide a buffer equal to roughly two months of import cover. Yet the country, with external debt exceeding $120 billion, faces persistent structural challenges: energy sector circular debt, provincial spending discipline and tax base expansion. The third review in Q3-Q4 2026 will test whether Pakistan can sustain reforms through a period of political pressure, particularly if flooding or other climate shocks force fiscal reallocation.
The pattern matters more than individual cases. If a critical mass of countries misses structural benchmarks or faces parliamentary resistance in Q2, 2026 could see a new wave of programme renegotiations and arrears, complicating the broader "debt resolution" narrative that has sustained investor confidence since 2023-2024. Ghana and Zambia, both emerging from debt restructurings, will reveal in their Q2 budgets and mid-year reviews how much political capital remains for multi-year primary surplus targets. Early signs of "reform fatigue" in Q2 would ripple through credit markets, widening spreads and reducing financing options precisely when multiple maturities cluster in Q3-Q4.
Structural benchmarks repeatedly collide with domestic politics in Q2, as Kenya's 2024 protests illustrated. The calendar of IMF Board meetings and the timing of parliamentary sessions create friction points. Finance ministers must often implement unpopular subsidy cuts or tax increases during budget approval cycles that coincide with IMF review periods. The Q2 2026 calendar repeats this pattern: budget laws are typically finalised in April to June across much of the Global South, precisely when IMF missions conduct field work for mid-year reviews. The collision is structural, not accidental, and it explains why Q2 frequently sees both political protests and programme delays.
Q3 2026: The hinge of the year
July marks the peak of the climate-damage season. South Asian monsoon and Sahel rainy season typically peak around July to August. For climate-vulnerable economies, this is when infrastructure fails, crops are lost and fiscal space is suddenly re-allocated to emergency spending. Research evidence shows that severe climate disasters in developing countries can cause GDP losses ranging from 1 to 5 percent (with agricultural disasters in vulnerable economies occasionally reaching higher), while government revenues typically drop by approximately 0.7 percent of GDP and emergency spending rises by approximately 2.2 percent of GDP. The combined effect can push budget deficits up by 0.7 to 3 percent of GDP in a single disaster year, with public debt potentially rising by 4 to 5 percent of GDP if the response is financed through borrowing rather than grants or existing reserves.
Bangladesh, with a median age of approximately 27 years and over 160 million people concentrated in flood-prone river deltas, exemplifies the risk. Pakistan, still recovering from 2022 floods that affected nearly 33 million people and caused losses exceeding 10 percent of GDP, remains acutely exposed. Ethiopia, where agriculture contributes over 30 percent of GDP and employs more than 60 percent of the workforce, faces recurring drought cycles that empirical studies show can reduce output growth by approximately 1.4 percentage points in the event year. For commodity exporters like Nigeria and Kazakhstan, where oil revenues account for substantial portions of government income, the interaction of climate shocks with commodity-price volatility creates compounded fiscal stress. Research shows that for oil-exporting economies, oil-price shocks alone can explain approximately 22 percent of government revenue variation and 46 percent of GDP variation, meaning a simultaneous climate disaster and commodity-price drop could trigger severe fiscal crisis.
Insurance renewal cycles for large infrastructure and industrial assets often line up with mid-year, meaning that the actuarial cost of recent disasters crystallises around this time. By late July, the budgetary impact of climate shocks for the year is becoming clear. For ministries of finance, this is when 2027's spending plans begin to bend under the weight of repeated disasters. Countries with limited fiscal buffers (Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia) may find Q3 climate events forcing immediate choices between debt service and emergency relief, a trade-off that can trigger IMF programme reviews and credit rating downgrades. Given that rating downgrades typically lead to market access loss for one to two years and reduce growth by over one percentage point on average (with tail-risk scenarios showing drops approaching three percentage points), the Q3 climate window carries significant fiscal and sovereign-risk implications.
August to September concentrates the year's diplomatic calendar. The BRICS summit (date and host to be confirmed at time of writing) is likely to focus on energy trade, local-currency settlement mechanisms and expansion of the BRICS New Development Bank's lending to climate and infrastructure projects. With potential new members (Ethiopia, Egypt, UAE, Iran and Saudi Arabia joined in 2024), the summit carries weight for countries seeking alternatives to dollar-denominated financing. The G20 summit (host rotation to a Global South member again in mid-2020s is likely, exact 2026 host not confirmed at time of writing) will keep debt restructuring frameworks, climate finance and trade fragmentation on the agenda.
Regional summits (AU, ASEAN, GCC, Mercosur and others) cluster in Q3 to Q4; their communiqués and side-meetings frequently pre-align positions for COP31 and other global forums. Q3's diplomatic calendar sets negotiating positions for the global summits of Q4. It is also where coalitions form around debt treatment, climate finance and trade rules, especially within the Global South. For countries like Indonesia (chairing ASEAN), India (G20 influence), South Africa (AU leadership) and Brazil (Mercosur anchor), these summits are opportunities to shape multilateral agendas before they reach binding negotiation stages.
Q4 2026: Decisions that leave scars
October brings Brazil to the polls. Latin America's largest economy, with GDP exceeding $2 trillion and a population of over 215 million, holds general elections in October 2026. The result will shape fiscal, energy and foreign policy for the second half of the decade, especially on Amazon protection, oil exploration and industrial policy. Knock-on effects ripple through Argentina (external debt exceeding $270 billion), Bolivia, Paraguay and the broader Mercosur area, particularly for trade policy and regional energy integration. For global investors, Brazil is an anchor emerging market. For the Global South, it is also a climate and food power, controlling substantial portions of global soybean, beef and sugar exports. The combination makes its 2026 election one of the most consequential of the year.
If Brazil's election produces fiscal expansion and commodity-friendly policies, it could ease pressure on regional peers. If it triggers austerity or policy uncertainty, the entire Latin American credit complex could face spread widening and reduced market access through 2027. Mexico, with external debt exceeding $600 billion, and Argentina, perpetually on the edge of restructuring, will feel the ripple effects most acutely. For commodity-dependent economies across the region, the fiscal implications are particularly stark: research shows that a sustained commodity-price drop (30 to 50 percent over one to two years) can trigger government revenue shortfalls of 20 to 30 percent, deficit increases of 2 to 4 percentage points of GDP, and external debt accumulation of 3 to 6 percentage points of GDP over two to three years. Brazil's policy direction will substantially influence regional commodity markets and fiscal sustainability across Latin America.
November tests climate finance on trial. Turkey hosts COP31 in Antalya, marking the first time the country has presided over a COP. Key issues are likely to include operationalisation of the loss-and-damage fund, scaling adaptation finance for vulnerable economies, and reconciling energy-transition demands with developing-country industrialisation. A central fault line will be whether climate-vulnerable states receive predictable concessional finance instead of ad-hoc pledges that fail to materialise.
For countries like Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Kenya, COP31 represents a deadline with fiscal implications. Without adequate adaptation finance, climate shocks will continue to impose fiscal costs averaging 2 to 3 percent of GDP per major event, with cumulative effects potentially raising debt by 4 to 5 percent of GDP per disaster when financed through borrowing. If adaptation finance flows materialise at COP31, it could reduce pressure on domestic budgets and IMF programme targets. If COP31 delivers only rhetoric, finance ministries will enter 2027 budgets knowing that climate shocks will continue to arrive without compensating international support. The outcome will influence sovereign ratings, project pipelines and national adaptation plans through the late 2020s. COP31 will test whether the climate regime can deliver usable capital to the Global South rather than rhetorical solidarity.
December closes the cycle with year-end liquidity pressures. Several countries bunch external debt service into Q4; missed payments or last-minute roll-overs often surface in November to December, when market liquidity is thinner and institutional investors have closed books for the year. Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia all face significant Q4 debt service, testing whether fiscal consolidation efforts through the year have generated sufficient buffers.
Budget laws for 2027 are finalised across much of the Global South in December, embedding the year's shocks into multi-year fiscal frameworks. Central bank strategy resets are prepared, with many monetary policy committees reviewing inflation performance and exchange-rate pressures over the year before signalling paths for 2027. December does not simply close the year; it writes the starting conditions for 2027. Whether governments choose consolidation, continued stimulus or renewed borrowing in their 2027 budgets will depend substantially on what happened at COP31, in Brazil's election and in markets earlier in Q4.
Cross-cutting themes for 2026
The calendar above is skeletal by design. The flesh consists of five cross-cutting themes that will run through many of these dates.
First, election legitimacy versus economic adjustment. In Uganda (median age approximately 16 years), Benin, Brazil and a string of sub-national polls from South Asia to Latin America, voters will walk into booths after years of high inflation, subsidy cuts and infrastructure failures. Governments facing IMF reviews or large roll-overs in the same year will struggle to implement unpopular reforms without political cost. The demographic pressure is acute: Nigeria's median age of 18.1 years, Ethiopia's 19.5 years and Kenya's 20.1 years create electorates with limited memory of previous crises and high expectations for immediate improvement. By contrast, China (median age 38.4 years) and Russia (39.6 years) face different political economies, where aging populations demand pension security over growth. The 2026 election calendar will test whether democratic legitimacy and IMF discipline can coexist.
Second, debt resolution fatigue. Countries emerging from restructurings will discover that the end of formal negotiations is not the end of austerity. Historical evidence suggests that sovereign debt restructurings impose average creditor haircuts of approximately 45 percent and take one to three years for pre-emptive exchanges or five to ten years for complex post-default cases. Domestic credit typically rebounds within one to two years after restructuring, but growth recovery depends heavily on whether debt-service burdens are sustainably reduced. As multi-year primary surplus targets bite, 2026 budgets will reveal how much political capital remains for reform. Ghana and Zambia, both post-restructuring, must maintain primary surpluses while external debt levels remain elevated. Egypt, carrying external debt exceeding $150 billion, faces interest payments that consume approximately 60 percent of government expenditure. Pakistan, with external debt exceeding $120 billion, must sustain reforms while reserves cover only two months of imports. The arithmetic is unforgiving, and 2026 budgets will show whether governments can maintain the discipline or whether political pressures force backsliding.
Third, climate as budget risk, not just humanitarian story. Floods, heatwaves and storms will not wait for COP31. They will strike during monsoon seasons and cyclone windows, forcing in-year budget revisions, emergency borrowing and re-prioritisation of capital spending. Research shows that severe climate disasters can cause GDP losses of 1 to 5 percent, trigger deficit increases of 0.7 to 3 percent of GDP, and raise public debt by 4 to 5 percent of GDP per major event if financed through borrowing. Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Kenya all face recurring climate shocks that can eliminate substantial portions of GDP in bad years. Without predictable adaptation finance from COP31 or other sources, these shocks will continue to derail fiscal plans and force countries back into emergency IMF facilities. The compound effect of climate disasters and commodity-price volatility creates particularly acute risk for oil-dependent economies like Nigeria, where revenue can swing by over 20 percent based on commodity markets alone.
Fourth, institutional calendars as power tools. The IMF Board, UNFCCC COP presidencies, G20 hosts and BRICS chairs effectively shape which issues receive global attention, and when. For the Global South, aligning domestic politics with these institutional calendars will be a quiet but important craft. Countries that time budget approval, subsidy reforms or state asset sales to coincide with IMF Board windows can unlock financing. Those that miss the calendar face delays that compound into crises. The Spring Meetings (13 to 18 April) and Annual Meetings (12 to 18 October) are fixed points; everything else must adapt around them.
Fifth, bandwidth scarcity. Even large bureaucracies struggle to manage simultaneous elections, debt negotiations and climate shocks. For many mid-income and frontier states, 2026 will be a test of administrative capacity: can treasuries, central banks and planning ministries respond to several deadlines at once without forcing a crisis? Egypt's case is instructive: managing a $9.2 billion IMF programme, $150 billion external debt, state asset divestment targets and energy sector reforms simultaneously while maintaining macroeconomic stability requires coordination that few governments can sustain. When bandwidth runs out, something breaks, and 2026's compressed calendar will test limits across multiple countries.
Using the Meridian calendar
This Global South 2026 Calendar is not a full list of every election or bond payment. It is a map of pressure points in time: moments when governments will be least able to absorb shocks; windows when international negotiations can unlock (or withhold) new financing; and junctions where politics, markets and climate risk intersect.
In the rest of The World Ahead 2026, we zoom in on the substance: debt, infrastructure, technology, labour, food and power. This calendar is the timeline on which those stories will unfold. Serious planning in 2026 will require not just knowing what matters, but when it hits the system.
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