Mauritius the External Constraint: Foreign Exchange, Reserves, and the Price of Stability

Mauritius Real Outlook 2025–2029 • Section 35

External Accounts, Foreign Exchange Regime, and Reserve Adequacy: From Flows to Buffers

Examining Mauritius' external position through balance of payments structure (current account oscillating -3% to +2% GDP, financed by capital inflows), managed float FX regime (rupee adjusted -35% nominally 2015-2025, intervention maintaining orderly conditions), and reserve buffers (gross reserves ~$7-8B/5-6 months imports, net usable reserves lower after contingent claims). Analysis reveals system where external accounts structurally tight rather than crisis-prone, managed stability postpones rather than eliminates adjustment need, reserves adequate for routine volatility but insufficient for prolonged stress without structural correction in external imbalances

External Accounts, the Foreign Exchange Regime, and Reserve Adequacy

For a small, highly open island economy such as Mauritius, external accounts are not a peripheral macroeconomic consideration but the central constraint within which all domestic policy operates. Growth, inflation, employment, fiscal space, and even political stability are ultimately conditioned by the country's capacity to earn, manage, and preserve foreign exchange. This section therefore examines Mauritius' external position through three tightly interlinked dimensions: the structure of its external accounts, the functioning of its foreign exchange regime, and the adequacy of its foreign exchange reserves as a buffer against external shocks.

Current Account Balance
-3% to +2%
% GDP — oscillates based on services performance
Rupee Adjustment
-35%
Nominal depreciation 2015-2025 (managed orderly decline)
Gross Reserves
5-6 months
Import cover (~$7-8B) — adequate but conditional

The Balance of Payments Identity: Financing the Gap

Mauritius' economic model is characterised by a persistent asymmetry between what it produces and what it consumes. The country imports a substantial share of its food, fuel, medicines, capital equipment, intermediate goods, and consumer products. As a result, merchandise trade deficits are structural rather than cyclical. These deficits are not, in themselves, evidence of failure; they are a common feature of small service-oriented economies. What matters instead is how those deficits are financed, how stable the financing sources are, and how resilient the external position remains under adverse global conditions.

The balance-of-payments identity provides the analytical backbone for this assessment. In simple terms, any current account deficit must be offset by capital and financial inflows or by a drawdown of reserves. When inflows are stable, productivity-enhancing, and long-term in nature, the external position can remain sustainable even in the presence of sizeable trade gaps. When inflows are volatile, opaque, or dependent on confidence rather than fundamentals, vulnerabilities accumulate quietly until they surface abruptly through currency pressure, reserve depletion, or inflationary shocks.

Balance of Payments Framework: How Mauritius Finances External Position

The BOP Identity: Understanding the Equation

Current Account (CA) = Trade Balance + Services Balance + Primary Income + Secondary Income (Transfers)

+ Capital & Financial Account (KFA) = Net FDI + Portfolio Investment + Other Investment + Reserve Assets

= CA + KFA + Statistical Discrepancy = 0

Any deficit in current account must be financed by net capital inflows or reserve drawdown. Any surplus can be used to accumulate reserves or repay external liabilities.

Mauritius Pattern (Typical Year):

• Merchandise trade deficit ~$4.4B (structural, continuous)

• Services surplus ~$2.5-3.0B (tourism + finance, variable)

• Primary income variable (FDI profits, interest flows)

• Secondary income modest positive (remittances)

Current Account: typically -3% to +2% GDP depending on services/tourism performance

• Net FDI inflows ~$200-500M annually

• Portfolio & other investment variable (opaque)

• Reserve changes absorb residual imbalances

Capital/Financial Account + Reserves finance current account when deficit, accumulate when surplus

BOP Component Typical Range Stability Role in External Balance
Goods Trade Balance -$4.0-4.8B annually STRUCTURAL DEFICIT Creates continuous financing requirement
Services Trade Balance +$2.5-3.5B annually CYCLICAL SURPLUS Primary compensating mechanism
Primary Income Balance Variable, often negative VOLATILE FDI profit repatriation, interest payments
Secondary Income +$100-200M STABLE Remittances—steady but modest
CURRENT ACCOUNT -3% to +2% GDP OSCILLATING Depends on services offsetting goods deficit
Net FDI +$200-500M annually STABLE Core financing source
Portfolio & Other Investment Variable, opaque VOLATILE Residual financing—can reverse rapidly
Reserve Assets (change) ±$500M-1.5B BUFFER Absorbs imbalances

BOP framework shows Mauritius external position depends on services compensating goods deficit plus modest capital inflows. When services underperform OR capital reverses, current account widens and reserves drawn. System structurally tight—limited margin for simultaneous shocks across multiple components.

Services as Stabilizers: The Compensating Mechanism Under Stress

In Mauritius' case, services exports—particularly tourism and financial services—have historically played the role of structural stabilisers. They generate foreign exchange that partially offsets the goods deficit and supports the currency. However, reliance on a narrow services base introduces its own fragilities. Tourism earnings are sensitive to global income cycles, geopolitical disruptions, pandemics, and climate risk. Financial services flows are exposed to regulatory shifts, international scrutiny, and reputational dynamics that lie largely outside domestic control. This means that the apparent comfort provided by services surpluses must be assessed alongside their volatility and concentration risk.

The foreign exchange regime occupies a pivotal position in this system. Mauritius operates a managed float in which the exchange rate is not fixed by law but is actively influenced through market operations. In such a regime, credibility substitutes for rigidity. The currency is expected to adjust to external conditions, but not in a disorderly manner that would destabilise prices, expectations, or balance sheets. This places a heavy operational burden on the central bank, which must balance inflation control, external competitiveness, and financial stability in an environment where import prices feed quickly into domestic living costs.

Reserve adequacy therefore becomes the final line of defence. Foreign exchange reserves are not merely a stock of assets; they represent time, optionality, and confidence. Adequate reserves allow a country to smooth temporary shocks, reassure markets, and avoid abrupt policy adjustments that would otherwise be socially and politically costly. Inadequate or encumbered reserves, by contrast, narrow policy space and amplify external disturbances. Assessing reserve adequacy thus requires more than citing headline figures. It requires examining what reserves are expected to cover, how quickly they could be mobilised, and how they relate to imports, short-term liabilities, and domestic liquidity.

Data Transparency: What's Missing in Mauritius BOP Reporting

A further complication in the Mauritian context lies in data transparency and consolidation. While headline balance-of-payments figures, reserve levels, and exchange-rate data are published, there is no single, fully integrated public dataset that allows continuous tracking of financial account composition, intervention volumes, or reserve usability over time:

  • Portfolio & other investment flows: As documented in Section 34, no consolidated annual series for portfolio investment or other investment (cross-border loans, deposits) published systematically 2015-2025. Cannot assess composition, volatility, or reversibility of capital financing beyond FDI headlines.
  • Central bank intervention volumes: No regular public disclosure of scale/frequency of FX market interventions. Market participants observe intervention effects (rupee volatility damped) but cannot quantify reserve use for intervention versus other purposes.
  • Net usable reserves: Gross reserves published but limited transparency on forward contracts, swap arrangements, contingent claims that reduce effective availability. Net international reserves calculation not systematically disclosed.
  • Import coverage evolution: While can calculate months of import cover from published data, no official series tracking adequacy thresholds over time or comparing to IMF/international benchmarks systematically.

Implication: Data absence does not invalidate analysis, but it does impose limits on precision and reinforces the importance of interpreting institutional gaps as findings in their own right. External account transparency deficit parallels capital account opacity documented in Section 34—pattern suggests institutional preference for aggregate reporting over detailed disclosure.

This section therefore treats Mauritius' external position not as a static balance sheet, but as a dynamic system shaped by structural trade patterns, service-export dependence, capital-flow quality, and institutional capacity. The analysis that follows will move sequentially from description to diagnosis, and from diagnosis to risk assessment. Subsequent subsections will examine the current, capital, and financial accounts in detail; the mechanics and implications of the foreign exchange regime; and the robustness of reserves under plausible stress scenarios. Together, they address a single underlying question: how long and under what conditions Mauritius can sustain its external model without incurring rising economic and social costs.

The External Accounts: Structure, Balances, and Long-Run Constraints

Mauritius' external accounts reflect the anatomy of a small, service-oriented, import-dependent economy whose growth model has matured faster than its capacity to generate diversified foreign exchange. The structure of the balance of payments reveals a persistent pattern: a large and recurring deficit on merchandise trade, a compensating surplus on services, intermittent net income and transfer inflows, and capital movements that are meaningful in scale but uneven in quality and transparency. This configuration has proven workable for long stretches, yet it embeds constraints that tighten as global conditions become less forgiving.

Current Account Components: Persistent Imbalance, Cyclical Compensation

At the core of the current account lies a chronic goods imbalance. Merchandise imports substantially exceed exports, driven by the economy's reliance on imported fuel, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, machinery, intermediate inputs, and consumer goods. Export capacity in goods, by contrast, remains narrow and relatively low value-added, with limited scope for rapid expansion without significant structural change. This imbalance is not a temporary deviation but a structural condition that has persisted across cycles and policy regimes. The implication is straightforward: Mauritius must continuously earn foreign exchange elsewhere or attract external financing to bridge the gap.

Services have historically fulfilled this role. Tourism receipts, financial and business services, transport, and other service exports have generated a sizable surplus that partially offsets the merchandise deficit. Over time, services have come to dominate the export profile, accounting for a substantial share of total exports and a significant portion of gross domestic product. This evolution reflects deliberate policy choices to position Mauritius as a regional services hub, leveraging political stability, legal infrastructure, and connectivity. However, the stabilising function of services should not be overstated. Service exports are highly concentrated, cyclical, and sensitive to shocks that originate beyond national borders. Periods of global disruption have repeatedly demonstrated how quickly services earnings can contract, leaving the external account exposed.

Mauritius Current Account Evolution 2015-2024: From Surplus to Stress

Period Current Account ($M) % GDP Key Drivers External Position
2015-2017 -$100-300M -0.8% to -2.2% Tourism strong, goods deficit moderate COMFORTABLE
2018-2019 -$300-600M -2.3% to -4.1% Goods deficit widening, imports surge MANAGEABLE
2020-2021 -$800M-1.2B -6.5% to -9.8% Tourism collapsed, services compensation vanished ACUTE STRESS
2022-2023 -$400-700M -2.8% to -4.5% Tourism partial recovery, goods deficit elevated RECOVERING
2024 (Est.) -$500-800M -3.2% to -5.0% Tourism near recovery, deficit structural TIGHTER

Estimates compiled from Bank of Mauritius BOP statements, IMF Article IV reports, Statistics Mauritius trade data. Pre-pandemic 2015-2019 shows manageable deficits -1% to -4% GDP. Pandemic 2020-2021 revealed fragility when services collapsed. Recovery 2022-2024 incomplete—current account deficits remain elevated, structural tightening evident.

Current Account Deterioration: Why Deficits Widened Post-Pandemic

Pre-pandemic baseline (2015-2019): Current account deficits averaged -1.5% to -3.5% GDP, manageable through combination of FDI inflows, portfolio flows, occasional reserve accumulation. System functioned smoothly—goods deficit offset by services, modest financing needs easily met.

Pandemic shock (2020-2021): Tourism earnings collapsed $1.8-2.0B → services surplus disappeared → goods deficit persisted (imports remained high for food, fuel, medical supplies) → current account deficit exploded to -6.5% to -9.8% GDP. Financing gap filled by: reserve drawdown ~$1.5-2.0B, IMF RFI ~$300M, bilateral support, domestic borrowing.

Post-pandemic recovery incomplete (2022-2024): Tourism recovered to ~80-90% pre-pandemic levels BUT goods deficit widened permanently due to commodity price inflation (energy, food) persisting post-2021. Services compensation restored but insufficient to return to pre-pandemic current account levels. Result: current account deficits now structurally -3% to -5% GDP versus -1.5% to -3.5% pre-2020.

Why permanent shift matters: Chronic -3% to -5% GDP current account deficits require continuous capital inflows or reserve use. Over 5 years at -4% average, cumulative financing need ~$2.5-3.0B. If capital inflows unstable, reserves deplete. If reserves protect, may require policy tightening (higher rates, fiscal austerity) to compress demand and improve balance. Either path costly.

Structural drivers preventing return to pre-2020 baseline: (1) Goods deficit structural widening from commodity prices maintaining elevation, (2) Tourism recovery incomplete—may never return to 2019 peak given structural shifts in global travel patterns, (3) Financial services facing regulatory headwinds limiting growth, (4) No new large-scale FX-earning sectors emerged to diversify services base. Mauritius facing "new normal" of wider chronic deficits requiring larger sustained financing.

Capital and Financial Account: Quality Matters More Than Quantity

Income flows and current transfers add further nuance to the picture. Primary income balances are influenced by profits, dividends, and interest linked to foreign investment and cross-border financial activity. These flows can be volatile and, in some cases, reverse direction depending on corporate performance and global financial conditions. Secondary income, including remittances, provides a modest but steady contribution, yet it is insufficient to materially alter the overall balance. Taken together, these components mean that the current account position oscillates around a structural deficit or narrow surplus, depending largely on the performance of a few key service sectors.

The financing of these imbalances brings the capital and financial account into focus. Foreign direct investment has played an important role, particularly in property, tourism-related assets, and financial services. While such inflows support foreign exchange availability and investment activity, their composition matters. Investment concentrated in non-tradable sectors generates limited export capacity and can amplify import demand, thereby weakening the current account over time rather than strengthening it. Portfolio flows and other investment categories are less visible in publicly consolidated data, but their potential volatility introduces additional uncertainty into the external financing mix.

Capital & Financial Account Composition: Stability vs Volatility

Component Annual Flow Stability Export Capacity Risk
Net FDI +$200-500M STABLE MIXED—some FX-earning Low—sticky, long-term
Portfolio Investment $100-400M range VOLATILE NONE—financial flows High—reverses rapidly
Other Investment Variable, opaque UNCERTAIN NONE—liabilities High—sudden stops
IMF/Multilateral $0-500M (episodic) STABLE (when disbursed) NONE—liability Stabilizing but signals distress

Capital account quality critical: FDI relatively stable and sticky, portfolio/other investment volatile and reversible. Mauritius' external sustainability depends on maintaining FDI inflows ($200-500M annually) as core financing while managing volatility of portfolio/other categories. When capital account dominated by stable FDI, external position resilient. When portfolio/hot money increases, vulnerability rises.

Long-Run Constraints: The Tightening External Grip

This structure gives rise to a set of long-run constraints that shape policy space. First, external sustainability depends disproportionately on a narrow set of earnings streams, increasing vulnerability to sector-specific shocks. Second, the import content of growth remains high, meaning that expansions in domestic demand quickly translate into pressure on the trade balance and the currency. Third, the quality and use of capital inflows determine whether external financing alleviates or exacerbates these pressures. When inflows finance productive capacity that generates foreign exchange, constraints ease. When they fuel consumption, asset inflation, or import-intensive activity, constraints tighten.

Mauritius' external accounts are not in immediate crisis, but they are structurally tight. They allow limited room for error, limited tolerance for prolonged shocks, and limited scope for policy experimentation that ignores foreign exchange realities.

In this context, the external accounts act less as a scoreboard and more as a discipline. They impose boundaries on fiscal expansion, shape monetary choices, and condition social outcomes through their influence on inflation and employment. Understanding these boundaries is essential for assessing the resilience of the foreign exchange regime and the adequacy of reserves, which are examined in the sections that follow.

The Foreign Exchange Regime: Managed Stability and Hidden Pressures

Mauritius operates a managed foreign exchange regime that sits between formal flexibility and practical intervention. The Mauritian rupee is not pegged to a single currency, nor is it allowed to float freely in a way that fully reflects market fundamentals. Instead, the exchange rate is shaped by a combination of market forces, central bank intervention, moral suasion, and institutional arrangements that smooth volatility while quietly accommodating structural imbalances in the external accounts.

The Managed Float: Theory and Practice

In formal terms, the exchange rate is market-determined. Banks, corporates, and authorised dealers transact foreign currency daily, and prices adjust in response to demand and supply conditions. In practice, however, the Bank of Mauritius plays a continuous stabilising role. It intervenes to dampen excessive volatility, to prevent disorderly market conditions, and, crucially, to manage the pace of depreciation in a manner consistent with inflation objectives, financial stability, and fiscal realities. This hybrid approach has delivered a degree of nominal stability that is politically and socially valuable, particularly in an import-dependent economy where exchange rate movements feed rapidly into domestic prices.

Mauritian Rupee Exchange Rate Evolution 2015-2025: Managed Depreciation

Period MUR/USD MUR/EUR Change vs USD Intervention Pattern
2015 ~35-36 ~40-41 Baseline Light intervention, stable
2017 ~35-36 ~40-42 Stable Tourism strong, services surplus
2019 ~36-37 ~40-42 -2.8% Gradual depreciation, orderly
2020 ~40-41 ~46-48 -11.1% Heavy intervention, reserves used
2021 ~42-43 ~49-51 -16.7% Pressure persists, orderly pace
2023 ~45-46 ~48-50 -25.0% Structural weakness, managed decline
2025 (Est.) ~48-49 ~51-53 -35.7% Cumulative depreciation, intervention limits volatility

Exchange rate data from Bank of Mauritius monthly averages, IMF IFS database. Rupee depreciated ~35% nominally against USD 2015-2025, ~25-30% against EUR. Pattern shows managed orderly decline—not free float (would show higher volatility) nor fixed peg (would require reserves exhaustion to maintain). BoM intervention smooths adjustment but cannot prevent structural depreciation when external accounts chronically deficit.

Central Bank Intervention Mechanics: How BoM Manages the Rupee

Daily FX market operations: Bank of Mauritius does not announce intervention but operates through authorized dealers (commercial banks) in FX market. When rupee under depreciation pressure (FX demand exceeds supply at prevailing rate), BoM supplies USD/EUR from reserves to authorized dealers who sell to market participants. This increases FX supply, supports rupee, limits depreciation. Conversely, when rupee strengthening excessively (FX supply exceeds demand), BoM purchases FX to accumulate reserves and prevent disruptive appreciation.

Smoothing not fixing: Intervention aims to dampen volatility and prevent disorderly moves, not maintain specific exchange rate level. BoM allows trend depreciation reflecting underlying imbalances but prevents sharp day-to-day swings that would disrupt trade/financial planning. Example: If market pressure pushes MUR/USD from 47 to 48 in single day, BoM intervenes to spread adjustment over days/weeks, making 47→47.3→47.6→48 over 2-3 weeks instead of overnight jump.

Reserve costs: Every intervention selling FX depletes reserves. Over 2020-2021 pandemic, heavy intervention to prevent disorderly rupee collapse used $1.5-2.0B reserves (estimated). This is non-trivial—represents ~20-25% of total reserve stock. Intervention thus not costless—trades present stability for future buffer capacity.

Liquidity management complexity: When BoM sells FX, receives rupees → withdraws rupee liquidity from banking system → can create credit tightening. Requires sterilization operations (BoM issues securities to absorb rupees, maintains liquidity conditions). Sterilization has fiscal costs (interest on securities) and affects monetary policy transmission. FX intervention thus entangled with domestic monetary conditions.

Implicit exchange rate target corridor: While no official band announced, market participants observe that BoM becomes more active when rupee moves >2-3% rapidly in either direction. Creates implicit expectations of bounded volatility—reduces hedging incentives for firms, may encourage speculation that BoM will defend certain levels. Double-edged: stabilizes short-term but can create one-way bets against rupee during persistent pressure periods.

Hidden Pressures: Structural Demand Exceeds Cyclical Supply

Yet this apparent stability masks deeper pressures. The underlying demand for foreign exchange is structurally strong, reflecting the scale of imports required to sustain consumption, investment, and public services. Export earnings, while significant, are uneven across the year and concentrated in sectors exposed to external shocks. Capital inflows provide episodic relief, but they are neither guaranteed nor always aligned with long-term external sustainability. The result is a persistent tendency for foreign exchange demand to exceed supply at prevailing prices, placing downward pressure on the currency.

Central bank intervention has been the primary mechanism for absorbing this pressure. By supplying foreign exchange from reserves during periods of stress, the authorities have been able to smooth adjustment and avoid abrupt depreciations. However, intervention is not costless. It reduces reserve buffers, influences liquidity conditions in the domestic banking system, and can create expectations that the currency will be defended within implicit bounds. Over time, such expectations may weaken incentives for exporters to hedge, for importers to adjust behaviour, or for the economy to reallocate resources toward foreign exchange–earning activities.

Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Inflation: Quantifying Transmission

Depreciation Scenario Import Price Impact CPI Impact (6-12mo) Purchasing Power Effect
10% Rupee Depreciation +6-8% imports +2.5-3.5pp CPI Real wages -2-3% if no adjustment
20% Rupee Depreciation +12-16% imports +5-7pp CPI Real wages -4-6%, consumption compressed
30% Depreciation (2015-2024) +18-24% cumulative +8-11pp cumulative Real wage erosion -6-10%, living standards compressed

Pass-through estimates based on Mauritius' high import dependence (~65% imports/GDP). Food and fuel show near 1:1 pass-through (prices rise proportionally to depreciation), other goods/services 50-70% pass-through. Given imports represent ~40% of CPI basket directly, plus indirect effects through transport/logistics costs, total CPI impact typically 25-35% of depreciation magnitude. Social dimension: Depreciation regressive—hurts lower-income households spending higher % income on imported food/fuel.

Fiscal-Monetary Entanglement: Exchange Rate as Quasi-Fiscal Policy

The exchange rate regime is also closely entangled with fiscal and quasi-fiscal dynamics. Government borrowing, state-owned enterprise activity, and off-balance-sheet interventions can all affect foreign exchange demand indirectly. When fiscal expansion raises import-intensive spending, pressure shifts to the external account. When public entities rely on foreign borrowing or foreign-currency-denominated contracts, currency risk accumulates outside the core budget. These linkages mean that exchange rate management cannot be understood in isolation from broader macroeconomic governance.

Another layer of complexity arises from the structure of the financial sector. Mauritius hosts a sizeable offshore and cross-border financial ecosystem, with transactions that may not be directly linked to the domestic real economy. While this sector generates foreign exchange earnings and supports reserves, it can also create volatility in flows that are sensitive to global financial conditions, regulatory changes, or reputational shifts. Managing the exchange rate in such an environment requires constant calibration, often in the absence of perfect information.

The social dimension of exchange rate policy further constrains adjustment. Depreciation improves external competitiveness in theory, but in Mauritius it also raises the cost of living quickly, given the high import content of food, fuel, and consumer goods. The pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation is relatively strong, making sharp adjustments politically costly and socially destabilising. This reality reinforces a bias toward gradualism, even when underlying fundamentals might point to a weaker equilibrium exchange rate.

Political Economy of Exchange Rate Management: Why Sharp Depreciation Avoided

Exchange rate policy in Mauritius is as much political as technical, driven by distributional consequences and electoral considerations:

  • Regressive inflation impact: Depreciation immediately raises prices for food, fuel, medicines—items consuming higher % of low-income household budgets. Poor households hit hardest. Middle class faces purchasing power erosion. Political cost high—protests, social unrest, electoral punishment.
  • Wage adjustment lag: Import prices rise within weeks of depreciation. Nominal wage adjustments occur slowly—annual negotiations, public sector reviews, informal sector no indexation. Creates 6-18 month period where real incomes decline sharply before wages catch up (if they do). Government bears political cost of real wage compression.
  • Public debt dynamics: While Mauritius public debt mostly domestic-currency denominated, some FX-denominated obligations exist. Depreciation increases rupee value of FX debt servicing, creating fiscal pressure. Perception of fiscal stress from depreciation reinforces political reluctance.
  • Business sector resistance: Import-dependent firms (retail, construction, manufacturing with high import content) face margin compression from rising input costs. Lobby against depreciation. Tourism sector benefits but less politically organized than import lobbies.
  • Electoral cycle effects: Governments facing elections within 12-18 months avoid sharp depreciation—too visible, too costly politically. Prefer gradual managed decline that distributes pain imperceptibly over time. Problem: gradual approach may be insufficient for external adjustment, allowing imbalances to accumulate.

Result: BoM manages rupee with implicit political constraint—cannot allow depreciation rapid enough to trigger social backlash or electoral damage. External adjustment therefore slower than economic fundamentals might require, necessitating larger reserve use and more prolonged gradual decline. Political economy creates path dependence toward managed gradual depreciation over sharp but efficient adjustment.

In sum, Mauritius' foreign exchange regime delivers managed stability rather than equilibrium clarity. It postpones adjustment rather than eliminating the need for it, buying time at the cost of accumulating latent pressures. As long as reserves remain adequate and confidence holds, this approach can function. But it leaves the economy exposed to shifts in external conditions that reduce policy room for manoeuvre. The sustainability of this regime therefore depends not only on central bank skill, but on whether the external accounts themselves evolve in a way that reduces the underlying imbalance between foreign exchange demand and supply.

Reserve Adequacy: Comfort, Coverage, and Constraint

Foreign exchange reserves occupy a central place in Mauritius' macroeconomic narrative. They are the buffer that allows the authorities to reconcile an import-intensive economic structure with a managed exchange rate regime, while maintaining confidence among investors, credit rating agencies, and households. On the surface, reserve levels have appeared broadly comfortable by conventional metrics. Beneath that surface, however, reserve adequacy in Mauritius is less a story of abundance than of careful constraint management.

Headline Reserve Levels: Apparent Comfort

In absolute terms, Mauritius has maintained reserves at levels that compare favourably with many small, open economies. When measured against standard indicators—such as months of import cover or short-term external liabilities—reserves have generally remained above minimum thresholds recommended by international financial institutions. This has provided reassurance that the country can meet external payment obligations, smooth temporary balance-of-payments shocks, and intervene in foreign exchange markets when volatility threatens macroeconomic stability.

Mauritius Foreign Exchange Reserves: Evolution and Adequacy Metrics 2015-2025

Year Gross Reserves Import Cover % GDP Assessment
2015 ~$4.2-4.5B ~7.5-8.0 mo ~35-38% COMFORTABLE
2017 ~$5.5-6.0B ~8.0-8.5 mo ~42-45% STRONG—peak levels
2019 ~$6.5-7.0B ~7.5-8.0 mo ~48-52% VERY COMFORTABLE
2020 ~$6.0-6.5B ~6.5-7.0 mo ~52-58% STRESSED—drawdown
2021 ~$6.8-7.2B ~6.0-6.5 mo ~55-60% RECOVERING
2023 ~$7.2-7.8B ~5.5-6.0 mo ~48-52% ADEQUATE
2025 ~$7.5-8.0B ~5.0-5.5 mo ~45-48% ADEQUATE BUT TIGHTER

Reserve data from Bank of Mauritius monthly bulletins, IMF IFS database. Import cover calculated using 12-month trailing imports. Pattern shows: (1) Pre-pandemic accumulation to comfortable ~8 months coverage, (2) Pandemic drawdown ~$500M-1.0B, (3) Recovery 2021-2023, (4) Import cover declining 2023-2025 not from reserve drop but from import value growth (commodity prices, consumption recovery). Absolute reserves adequate, but coverage tightening.

Adequacy Thresholds: Beyond Simple Ratios

Yet adequacy cannot be judged by ratios alone. The structure of Mauritius' economy matters. Imports account for a large share of GDP, not only for consumer goods but for energy, food, intermediate inputs, and capital equipment. This means that the effective "burn rate" of reserves during periods of stress can be high. A few months of import cover may appear sufficient on paper, but in practice the economy's reliance on uninterrupted external supply chains reduces the margin for error. Reserves must be large enough not only to cover average imports, but to withstand spikes in global prices, shipping disruptions, or sudden stops in capital inflows.

Reserve Adequacy Metrics: Mauritius vs International Benchmarks

Adequacy Metric International Benchmark Mauritius 2024-25 Assessment
Import Cover ≥3mo minimum, 5-6mo comfortable ~5.0-5.5 months ADEQUATE
Short-Term Debt Coverage Reserves ≥100% short-term debt ~150-180% STRONG
Broad Money (M2) Coverage Reserves ≥20% M2 ~28-32% ADEQUATE
IMF ARA Metric 100-150% of benchmark ~90-110% BORDERLINE
Reserves / GDP No strict benchmark ~45-48% High—reflects openness

Benchmarks from IMF reserve adequacy assessments. Mauritius performs well on traditional metrics (import cover, short-term debt coverage) but borderline on comprehensive IMF ARA metric which weights multiple risks. Conclusion: reserves adequate for routine volatility and short-term shocks, but not abundant shield against prolonged stress or multiple simultaneous shocks.

Net Usable Reserves: The Hidden Deduction

A further dimension of reserve adequacy in Mauritius lies in the credibility of access rather than the headline stock. Not all reserves are equally liquid in moments of stress. Portions may be encumbered by short-term liabilities, forward positions, or implicit policy commitments that reduce their effective availability. While official disclosures confirm gross reserve levels, there is limited public transparency on net usable reserves once forward contracts, swap arrangements, and other contingent claims are taken into account. For a small open economy, this distinction is not academic: market confidence often hinges on perceptions of usable buffers rather than published totals.

Gross vs Net Reserves: What's Actually Available?

Gross International Reserves (GIR): Total FX assets held by Bank of Mauritius. Includes: foreign currency deposits, foreign government bonds, SDRs, gold, foreign securities. Published figure ~$7.5-8.0B (2024-2025). This is headline number reported publicly and used for international comparisons.

Deductions to reach Net International Reserves (NIR):

• Forward FX contracts: If BoM sold FX forward (future delivery commitments), these create obligations reducing usable reserves. Not systematically disclosed publicly.

• Short-term FX liabilities: Any borrowing by BoM in foreign currency due within 12 months reduces net reserves. Includes swap arrangements, repo agreements.

• IMF liabilities: Outstanding credit to IMF (e.g., RFI disbursements) technically reduces reserves though practically available until repayment due.

• Non-usable assets: Some reserve assets may be pledged as collateral or held in forms not immediately liquidable.

Estimated deductions: While precise data not published, typical EM country sees 5-15% deduction from GIR to NIR. Assuming conservative 10% for Mauritius → NIR ~$6.8-7.2B versus GIR ~$7.5-8.0B.

Why distinction matters: During crisis, only NIR actually available for intervention or payments. If market expects GIR available but BoM can only mobilize NIR, gap creates confidence problem. Rating agencies, IMF assessments increasingly focus on NIR not GIR. Lack of public NIR disclosure creates information asymmetry—investors uncertain about true buffer size.

Implication for Mauritius: If NIR ~$6.8-7.2B versus GIR $7.5-8.0B, import cover drops to ~4.5-5.0 months instead of 5.0-5.5 months. Still adequate but closer to minimum comfortable threshold. In stress scenario requiring $1.5-2.0B reserves (pandemic-level), usable buffer smaller than headline suggests. Transparency on NIR would improve market confidence by removing uncertainty.

Reserves as Bridge Not Destination: The Time-Buying Limit

The composition of external liabilities also complicates the picture. While public external debt is relatively moderate compared with some peers, private sector exposures, offshore financial flows, and contingent liabilities linked to state-owned enterprises all contribute to potential foreign exchange demand in adverse scenarios. These exposures are not always visible in headline reserve adequacy ratios, yet they can materialise rapidly during periods of financial stress or confidence loss.

Reserve accumulation itself has involved trade-offs. Periods of reserve growth have often coincided with strong capital inflows, favourable tourism receipts, or central bank intervention that absorbs foreign currency from the market. Conversely, episodes of reserve drawdown have reflected efforts to stabilise the currency, manage external shocks, or offset widening trade deficits. Each intervention decision implicitly balances present stability against future flexibility. Using reserves today to smooth adjustment reduces the buffer available tomorrow.

The regional and global context also matters. Mauritius operates in an environment characterised by volatile capital flows, shifting global interest rate cycles, and recurrent external shocks—from pandemics to energy price spikes and geopolitical disruptions. In such a setting, reserve adequacy is not static. A level that appears comfortable in a benign global environment may prove insufficient under synchronised external stress. The experience of recent years has shown that shocks are no longer isolated or short-lived, but overlapping and persistent, increasing the precautionary demand for reserves.

Moreover, reserves cannot indefinitely substitute for adjustment. Persistent current account deficits financed through reserve drawdowns or episodic inflows expose the economy to a gradual erosion of external resilience. In this sense, reserve adequacy should be interpreted as a bridge, not a destination. It buys time for structural correction—whether through export diversification, reduced import dependence, or improved productivity—but does not replace it. When reserves are repeatedly deployed to stabilise outcomes without parallel progress on the real economy, their signalling value weakens and vulnerability accumulates.

Distributional and Political Economy Dimensions of Reserves

There is also a distributional and political economy dimension to reserve management often overlooked in technical discussions:

  • Reserve accumulation costs: Building reserves requires central bank purchasing FX from market → injects rupee liquidity → may require sterilization (issuing securities) → creates interest cost → fiscal impact. Accumulating $1B additional reserves might cost $30-50M annually in sterilization interest. Costs ultimately borne domestically through fiscal channel or inflation.
  • Reserve depletion costs: Using reserves to stabilize rupee during stress postpones inflation/depreciation short-term but reduces buffer for future shocks. Benefits current generation (maintains purchasing power) at potential cost to future (less crisis capacity). Political economy: governments facing elections incentivized to use reserves generously to maintain stability, leaving less buffer for successor.
  • Distributional effects of reserve policy: Reserve use to limit depreciation benefits import-dependent households and firms (maintains real incomes) but may harm export sectors and tourism (reduces competitiveness). Reserve policy thus has winners/losers even if framed as technical stabilization.
  • Public perception and signaling: Reserve levels closely watched by public, media, opposition. Visible decline generates political pressure even before hitting inadequate levels technically. Creates path dependence—once reserves high, politically difficult to accept significant decline even if economically optimal adjustment path.

Result: Reserve management as much about political economy as technical adequacy—must navigate distributional consequences, electoral cycles, public perception while maintaining external confidence and meeting international benchmarks. Complexity explains why reserve policy often conservative (maintaining higher buffers than minimum adequate) despite fiscal costs of accumulation.

In summary, Mauritius' foreign exchange reserves provide a measure of comfort, but that comfort is conditional and finite. They remain sufficient to manage routine volatility and short-term shocks, yet increasingly constrained by the economy's structural characteristics and exposure to global uncertainty. The durability of reserve adequacy will depend less on the size of the buffer itself than on whether underlying external imbalances are narrowed. Without such adjustment, reserves risk becoming a stabilising instrument that masks fragility rather than a safeguard that secures long-term external stability.

Sustainability of the External Position: Risks, Buffers, and Adjustment Capacity

Mauritius' external position at mid-decade reflects a familiar pattern for small, open, import-dependent economies that rely on services exports and capital inflows to offset persistent merchandise trade deficits. The country's external accounts are not characterised by acute imbalance, but neither are they structurally robust. Sustainability rests less on the strength of any single pillar than on the continued interaction between tourism receipts, financial services inflows, foreign investment, and the credibility of macroeconomic management.

Structural Exposure: The Binding Constraints

The external current account remains structurally exposed due to the scale of the goods trade deficit, which is a direct consequence of limited domestic production capacity and high dependence on imported food, fuel, capital goods, and intermediate inputs. This deficit is partially and, in favourable years, substantially offset by services exports, particularly tourism and offshore financial activities. However, this offset is cyclical rather than guaranteed. External demand shocks, shifts in global travel patterns, regulatory pressure on international financial centres, or geopolitical disruptions can quickly weaken the services surplus on which external balance depends.

External Sustainability Risk Matrix: Vulnerabilities and Transmission Channels

Risk Factor Likelihood Impact Transmission Mitigation
Tourism Shock MODERATE SEVERE Services collapse $1.5-2.0B → CA deficit widens 4-6pp GDP LOW—no substitute
Finance Regulatory Crackdown MODERATE MODERATE Services fall $300-700M → CA widens 2-4pp → FDI declines MODERATE—compliance
Capital Flow Reversal MODERATE MODERATE Outflows $500M-1.0B → reserves drawn → rupee pressure MODERATE—rate hikes
Commodity Price Spike HIGH MODERATE Import bill +$300-800M → goods deficit widens LOW—price taker
Climate Shocks HIGH MODERATE Reconstruction $200-500M → import surge MODERATE—insurance
Credit Rating Downgrade MODERATE MODERATE Borrowing costs +100-200bps → capital inflows decline HIGH—policy response
Regional Instability LOW-MOD MODERATE Tourism caution if region unsafe → services affected HIGH—stability advantage

Risk assessment shows Mauritius faces multiple moderate-probability risks with significant external account impacts. Most concerning: simultaneous shocks (e.g., pandemic + commodity spike as 2020-2022) that exhaust multiple adjustment channels concurrently. Single shocks manageable through reserves + adjustment, combined shocks require external support.

The Managed Float as Adjustment Mechanism

The foreign exchange regime has functioned as a stabilising mechanism rather than a rigid anchor. The managed float allows the Mauritian rupee to absorb external shocks while avoiding the credibility risks associated with a fixed exchange rate in an economy with limited reserves and high import elasticity. In practice, exchange rate flexibility has acted as a pressure valve, supporting competitiveness during external downturns and limiting reserve depletion. At the same time, sustained depreciation carries distributional and inflationary costs, particularly for households, given the high pass-through from exchange rate movements to imported consumer prices. This creates an inherent policy trade-off between external adjustment and domestic price stability.

Foreign exchange reserves provide an important, but not unlimited, buffer. Reserve levels have remained within broadly accepted adequacy thresholds when measured against months of import cover and short-term external liabilities. This affords the authorities a degree of room to manage volatility, smooth disorderly market conditions, and meet external obligations. However, reserve adequacy in Mauritius should be understood as conditional rather than absolute. The buffer is sufficient for liquidity management and temporary shocks, but it does not insulate the economy from prolonged external stress or structural deterioration in export performance.

Adjustment Mechanisms: How Mauritius Responds to External Stress

MECHANISM 1: Exchange Rate Depreciation (Primary Adjuster)

Process: External pressure → rupee depreciates. BoM allows gradual adjustment while smoothing volatility.

Effects: Tourism competitiveness↑, import costs↑ (inflation), real incomes↓, imports↓ marginally.

Effectiveness: MODERATE—helps but insufficient given low import elasticity.

Constraint: Social tolerance for inflation limits speed. Political economy prevents sharp moves.

MECHANISM 2: Reserve Deployment (Temporary Buffer)

Process: BoM supplies FX from reserves to meet demand, limiting rupee depreciation speed.

Effects: Smooths adjustment, prevents disorderly moves, maintains confidence.

Effectiveness: HIGH for temporary shocks (3-12mo). LOW for prolonged imbalances.

Constraint: Using $1.5-2.0B reduces buffer from ~8mo to ~5-6mo import cover.

MECHANISM 3: Demand Compression (Fiscal/Monetary Tightening)

Process: Raise rates, reduce spending, limit credit to compress domestic demand.

Effects: Imports↓, growth↓, unemployment↑, current account improves.

Effectiveness: HIGH—mathematically reduces external imbalance.

Constraint: Socially/politically costly. Creates recession. Last resort only.

MECHANISM 4: External Support (Multilateral/Bilateral Financing)

Process: Seek IMF RFI, bilateral swaps, World Bank loans when reserves insufficient.

Effects: Provides FX liquidity, buys time, but creates repayment obligations.

Effectiveness: HIGH for acute liquidity gaps. Doesn't solve structural imbalances.

Constraint: IMF support typically conditional (fiscal consolidation, reforms). Political cost.

Sequencing in Practice: Typical Adjustment Path Under Stress

Phase 1 (Months 0-6): Use reserves to stabilize FX market, allow gradual rupee depreciation, maintain policy rates, hope shock temporary.

Phase 2 (Months 6-18): If pressure persists, accelerate depreciation pace, begin monetary tightening (rate hikes), implement modest fiscal adjustment, continue reserve use but more conservatively.

Phase 3 (Months 18-36): If still inadequate, seek external support (IMF), implement comprehensive adjustment program (demand compression, structural reforms), accept recession as price of external rebalancing.

Mauritius experienced Phase 1-2 during pandemic 2020-2021, avoided Phase 3 through tourism recovery and IMF RFI. Future stress may require full sequence if shocks more prolonged.

Capital Flows: Complementary but Confidence-Sensitive

Capital flows play a complementary role in sustaining the external position, particularly through foreign direct investment and global business inflows. These flows help finance the current account gap and support reserve accumulation in periods of confidence. Yet they are sensitive to global financial conditions, regulatory perceptions, and reputational factors. Mauritius' experience demonstrates that while capital inflows can be resilient, they are not immune to sudden reversals or gradual erosion if the investment narrative weakens.

Taken together, the sustainability of Mauritius' external position depends less on headline reserve metrics or short-term balance outcomes than on the economy's capacity to adjust. Adjustment, in this context, is achieved through a combination of exchange rate flexibility, demand compression when necessary, and the ability of services exports to recover quickly after shocks. This adjustment model has worked historically, but it leaves the economy structurally exposed to repeated external stress rather than insulated from it.

Fragility Not Insolvency: The Central Vulnerability

The central vulnerability is not insolvency, but fragility. External balance is maintained through continuous adaptation rather than structural strength. As long as tourism remains competitive, financial services retain market access, and macroeconomic credibility is preserved, the external position is manageable. However, the margin for error is limited. A simultaneous shock to services exports and capital inflows would test both the exchange rate regime and reserve buffers, forcing sharper domestic adjustment.

In this sense, Mauritius' external accounts are sustainable under current conditions, but not self-reinforcing. They require ongoing policy discipline, external confidence, and favourable global conditions. Without deeper export diversification, stronger domestic production capacity, or a broader base of foreign exchange earnings, external sustainability will remain contingent rather than assured.

This places the external sector at the core of the country's medium-term macroeconomic risk profile. The analysis now transitions to Section 36, which will examine how these external constraints interact with fiscal dynamics, debt sustainability, and the state's capacity to absorb shocks without triggering broader economic distress.

Section 35 examines Mauritius' external position through balance of payments structure (current account oscillating -3% to +2% GDP based on services performance offsetting structural goods deficit ~$4.4B, worsened post-pandemic from -1.5-3.5% to -3-5% GDP due to commodity price elevation and incomplete tourism recovery), managed float FX regime (rupee depreciated ~35% nominally 2015-2025 from ~35-36 to ~48-49 MUR/USD through orderly managed decline, Bank of Mauritius intervention smooths volatility but cannot prevent trend depreciation when external accounts chronically deficit, exchange rate pass-through to inflation strong ~25-35% of depreciation magnitude given high import dependence creating political constraint on adjustment speed), and reserve adequacy (gross reserves ~$7.5-8.0B providing 5.0-5.5 months import cover, adequate by international benchmarks but tightening as imports grow, net usable reserves estimated ~$6.8-7.2B after deductions for forward contracts and contingent claims creating 4.5-5.0 months actual coverage closer to minimum comfort threshold, pandemic drawdown 2020-2021 used $1.5-2.0B demonstrating stress capacity but reduced buffer). Current account evolution shows pre-pandemic baseline manageable -1.5% to -3.5% GDP, pandemic shock -6.5% to -9.8% requiring reserve drawdown + IMF RFI $300M + bilateral support, post-pandemic recovery incomplete with deficits now structurally -3% to -5% GDP requiring continuous larger sustained financing creating chronic vulnerability. FX regime analysis reveals political economy constraint where depreciation regressive (hurts low-income households through food/fuel price increases), wage adjustment lags creating real income compression, electoral cycles discourage sharp adjustment favoring gradual managed decline accumulating latent pressures, intervention mechanics show BoM supplies FX from reserves dampening volatility but depleting buffer (every $1B intervention ~13-15% of reserve stock). Reserve adequacy assessment documents gross reserves adequate on traditional metrics (5-6 months imports, 150-180% short-term debt coverage, 28-32% M2 coverage) but borderline on IMF composite ARA metric 90-110%, net usable reserves lower than headline after contingent claims deduction, transparency deficit on NIR calculation creates information asymmetry with markets. Risk matrix identifies multiple moderate-probability threats: tourism demand shock likelihood MODERATE impact SEVERE (collapse $1.5-2.0B services exports), financial services regulatory crackdown MODERATE/MODERATE (-$300-700M), global capital reversal MODERATE/MODERATE (outflows $500M-1.0B), commodity price spikes HIGH/MODERATE (+$300-800M import bill), climate shocks HIGH/MODERATE (reconstruction $200-500M per event), simultaneous shocks most dangerous exhausting multiple adjustment channels concurrently. Adjustment mechanisms framework shows four-stage response: (1) Exchange rate depreciation primary adjuster but effectiveness MODERATE given low import elasticity and services export pricing less price-sensitive, (2) Reserve deployment HIGH effectiveness for temporary shocks but finite buffer limit ~$1.5-2.0B use before approaching minimum adequacy, (3) Demand compression through fiscal/monetary tightening HIGH effectiveness mathematically but socially/politically costly creates recession unemployment, (4) External support IMF/multilateral HIGH for acute liquidity but signals distress creates repayment obligations typically conditional. Sustainability assessment concludes external accounts structurally tight not crisis-prone, manageable under current conditions but not self-reinforcing, limited margin for error with simultaneous shocks testing system, central vulnerability fragility not insolvency requiring continuous adaptation rather than structural strength, sustainability contingent on policy discipline + external confidence + favorable global conditions not assured through diversified earning capacity. Data transparency gaps parallel Section 34 findings: no systematic disclosure of intervention volumes, NIR calculation not published, portfolio/other investment flows opaque beyond FDI, pattern reinforces institutional preference for aggregate reporting limiting external scrutiny. Section establishes that external position functions as binding constraint on domestic policy space, determines inflation/employment/fiscal outcomes through FX availability, sustainability depends less on reserve stocks than whether underlying imbalances narrowed through export diversification or import substitution which has not materially occurred 2015-2025.

Section 35 of 42 • Mauritius Real Outlook 2025–2029 • The Meridian