Dependence and the Asymmetry of Measurement

Mauritius' economic model remains structurally dependent on external supply chains for essential goods—most notably food, energy, and a wide range of consumer products. This dependence is a defining feature of the island's development trajectory rather than a temporary imbalance, and it reflects a combination of geographic constraints, production limitations, and policy choices that have prioritised openness and services over domestic substitution. The country has prospered not by defying these constraints but by working within them: exporting services, importing goods, and managing the resulting exposure through prudent macroeconomic policy.

Yet what can be measured reveals only part of the story. According to World Bank data derived from UN Comtrade aggregates, food accounted for 21.22 per cent of Mauritius' total merchandise imports in 2024. This single data point confirms substantial reliance. What it cannot reveal is trajectory: whether Mauritius has become more or less food-import dependent since the mid-2010s, whether domestic production has expanded or contracted relative to consumption, or whether policy interventions have yielded measurable substitution. No publicly available annual time series from the World Bank, UN Comtrade, FAO, or Statistics Mauritius tracks food imports as a share of total imports or domestic consumption over the past decade. As a result, it is not possible to determine, using open institutional data, whether import dependence is narrowing, widening, or stable—despite frequent policy references to food security and local production.

The composition of merchandise imports further illustrates the structural nature of this dependence. According to UN Comtrade/WITS country profiles for 2023, consumer goods accounted for approximately 55 per cent of total merchandise imports, while intermediate goods, raw materials, and capital goods together made up the remainder. This import structure indicates that a large share of external dependence is tied directly to household consumption rather than solely to productive investment or industrial inputs. In practical terms, this limits the scope for rapid import substitution: reducing consumer-goods imports would require either significant changes in consumption patterns or the development of competitive domestic manufacturing capacity, neither of which can be achieved quickly or without political cost.

Energy dependence is even more acute, though it is less transparently documented. Historical World Bank and WITS indicators show that in the mid-2010s more than 80 per cent of total energy use was met through net energy imports, reflecting near-total reliance on imported fossil fuels. After approximately 2016, however, this indicator is no longer published in the World Bank's open databases for Mauritius, and no alternative publicly accessible institutional series fills the gap. While it is widely acknowledged in international assessments that Mauritius remains highly energy-import dependent, the absence of updated published figures prevents precise quantification of current exposure or of any progress made through renewable energy initiatives.

The Concentration of Supply Risk

Supply-chain exposure is shaped not only by what Mauritius imports but by where those imports originate. In 2023, the country sourced a significant share from a small group of partners: China, the United Arab Emirates, India, South Africa, and France collectively accounted for a large proportion of total merchandise imports. The WITS merchandise trade profile reports an import partner concentration index of 0.06, suggesting moderate diversification rather than extreme dependence on a single source. Yet the lack of publicly available multi-year data means it is not possible to assess whether partner concentration has increased or decreased over time, or how resilient supply chains would be to disruptions affecting key trading partners.

More critically, logistical concentration compounds partner concentration. As a geographically isolated island economy, Mauritius is structurally dependent on maritime shipping routes, global freight markets, and international insurance regimes. A limited number of shipping corridors, port services, and transit hubs handle the bulk of inbound flows. Freight cost volatility, insurance repricing during geopolitical crises, and congestion in global shipping networks have repeatedly demonstrated that supply risk is nonlinear and poorly captured by trade-share metrics alone. Disruptions in any of these domains can propagate rapidly into domestic supply chains, even when partner diversification appears adequate on paper.

Food Security, Agricultural Constraints, and Substitution Limits

Mauritius' food import dependence is not the result of policy neglect alone but of enduring structural constraints that sharply limit the scope of domestic substitution. The island's physical geography imposes immediate ceilings on agricultural expansion. Arable land is scarce, fragmented, and increasingly contested by urbanisation, tourism development, and infrastructure expansion. Water availability is uneven and increasingly volatile, while climate variability—documented in Section 37—has raised yield uncertainty and increased production risk across multiple crop categories. These constraints operate independently of political intent and define the outer boundary of feasible food self-sufficiency.

Labour dynamics further weaken substitution capacity. The agricultural workforce is ageing, with limited inflows of younger workers, and productivity growth has lagged behind that of import-origin suppliers operating at continental scale. Domestic production therefore faces a structural cost disadvantage, particularly for staples and processed foods where global suppliers benefit from scale economies, mechanisation, and subsidised logistics. In this context, food imports function not only as a supply necessity but also as a price-stabilisation mechanism that shields households from volatility that domestic production alone could not absorb.

Policy choices have historically reinforced this equilibrium. The political economy of food pricing in a small, import-dependent society prioritises affordability and predictability over producer protection. Import substitution, where attempted, has therefore been selective and cautious, confined to niches—certain fresh vegetables, poultry in controlled environments, niche agro-processing—rather than system-wide transformation. The result is a food system that is resilient in supply continuity terms but structurally dependent, with limited scope for rapid substitution without accepting higher consumer prices or fiscal support burdens that would strain budgets already documented under pressure in Section 36.

Energy Dependence and the Illusion of Transition

Energy import dependence represents a deeper and more rigid constraint than food. Mauritius lacks domestic fossil fuel resources and remains structurally tied to imported petroleum products for electricity generation, transport, and industrial use. While renewable energy targets feature prominently in policy discourse—government commitments speak of reaching 40 per cent renewable electricity by 2030—the physical realities of intermittency, grid stability, storage capacity, and scale impose binding limits on how quickly imports can be displaced.

Renewable deployment, though expanding, operates within a narrow margin. Solar and wind generation face land constraints documented in Section 37's climate analysis, weather variability affecting output consistency, and integration challenges within a small, isolated grid that lacks the redundancy and interconnection options available to continental systems. Storage technologies—battery systems critical for balancing intermittent supply—remain capital-intensive and have not yet reached a scale that would materially reduce import exposure. Hydroelectric capacity is largely exhausted; bagasse from sugar production provides seasonal contribution but is tied to agricultural cycles. As a result, the energy transition has functioned more as a diversification of sources than as a substitution of imports.

This gap between narrative and structure creates what may be termed an illusion of transition: policy frameworks signal long-term intent, renewable capacity statistics suggest progress, yet near- and medium-term external dependence remains largely unchanged. The most recent published figure—over 80 per cent net energy imports in the mid-2010s—has not been updated, but there is little evidence suggesting dramatic structural reversal. Energy imports therefore continue to transmit global price shocks directly into domestic inflation, balance-of-payments pressures documented in Section 36, and fiscal risk through subsidy demands when petroleum prices spike.

The Political Economy of Import Dependence

The persistence of import dependence is not accidental. It reflects an institutional equilibrium in which imports play a stabilising role across multiple dimensions of governance. Cheap and reliable imports dampen inflation, reduce social unrest over cost-of-living pressures, and simplify macroeconomic management in a small open economy where domestic production capacity is constrained. In this sense, import dependence has been politically functional—it has enabled consumption standards that domestic productive capacity alone could not support, while foreign exchange earning sectors such as tourism, financial services, and offshore activities have financed the import bill.

This arrangement has weakened incentives to undertake the long-gestation investments in agriculture, energy infrastructure, or manufacturing that import substitution would require. As long as foreign exchange inflows are sufficient to finance imports, the economic system remains operational even if domestic productive capacity stagnates. Patient capital, coordination across ministries, and tolerance for transitional costs—higher prices during capacity build-up, employment disruption in import-competing sectors, fiscal outlays for industrial policy—are all politically costly. In contrast, maintaining import flows offers immediate stability at lower political risk.

Market structure reinforces this inertia. Import channels are often dominated by established firms with logistics expertise, supplier relationships, and pricing power. These incumbencies raise entry barriers for domestic alternatives: new entrants cannot match the scale, reliability, or cost structure of global suppliers accessed through established import networks. Import substitution, where discussed, therefore tends to remain rhetorical, fragmented into pilot programmes and niche initiatives rather than pursued as systemic transformation. Policy announcements signal intent, but resource allocation—measured by budget commitments, regulatory support, and institutional coordination—reveals limited follow-through.

What has changed, however, is the sustainability of this arrangement. Section 36 documented external account deterioration and reserve pressure. Section 37 established climate risks that threaten both import-earning sectors (tourism) and import costs (food price transmission from global supply disruptions). The political economy equilibrium that made import dependence functional now faces structural stress: foreign exchange generation is under pressure precisely when external vulnerability is rising. Import substitution, long deferred as economically suboptimal or politically difficult, may transition from discretionary policy choice to forced adjustment if external financing constraints tighten.

Where Substitution Is Feasible—and Where It Is Not

Import substitution rhetoric often outpaces economic reality. Mauritius cannot manufacture automobiles, refine pharmaceuticals at scale, produce semiconductors, or grow wheat competitively. These are not policy failures but structural impossibilities rooted in scale, technology, and comparative advantage. A nation of 1.3 million cannot replicate supply chains optimised for hundreds of millions. Attempting to do so would waste resources and lower living standards through inefficiency.

The relevant question is where substitution is economically viable and strategically valuable. Several categories offer credible potential, though each faces constraints that limit pace and scale. Fresh vegetables and fruits represent the most accessible opportunity: Mauritius currently imports an estimated 40 to 60 per cent of consumption, sourced from South Africa, Kenya, Madagascar, and further afield. Expanding greenhouse agriculture, improving irrigation efficiency where water permits, and introducing climate-adapted varieties could realistically expand domestic production by 20 to 30 per cent over five to seven years. Investment needs are modest relative to other categories—perhaps $30 to $80 million for infrastructure, technology transfer, and working capital support—with potential to create 2,000 to 4,000 agricultural jobs while reducing import bills by $60 to $120 million annually.

Poultry and egg production offer similar logic but different constraints. Domestic production faces feed costs—corn and soy must be imported—meaning substitution is partial rather than complete. Biosecurity risks require careful management. Yet reducing imports by 15 to 25 per cent appears achievable with improved farm efficiency and controlled-environment techniques. Aquaculture holds potential, particularly for species suited to lagoon farming or offshore cages, though technical capacity remains limited and initial investments carry higher risk than land-based agriculture.

Energy presents the most credible large-scale substitution opportunity, despite the constraints documented in Section 38.2. Scaling solar and wind to supply 40 per cent of electricity generation by 2030 is technically feasible with $300 to $600 million investment over the period. This would displace fossil fuel imports worth $80 to $150 million annually once capacity is operational—a payback period of four to seven years before considering energy security, price stability, and climate benefits. The binding constraints are grid integration, land allocation, and sustained capital mobilisation, not fundamental technical or economic viability.

Conversely, staple cereals—rice and wheat—offer virtually no substitution potential. Arable land and water requirements exceed what Mauritius can provide without displacing higher-value land uses. Attempting domestic rice production would be economically irrational: yields would be low, costs prohibitive, and opportunity costs—diverting land from vegetables, conservation, or tourism infrastructure—severe. The pragmatic strategy is supplier diversification, not production. Similarly, capital goods, machinery, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and most manufactured consumer goods will remain 100 per cent import-dependent. Scale economies, technology requirements, and global supply chain integration make domestic production unfeasible. Accepting this reality allows policy focus where intervention can be effective.

Strategic Boundaries and Diversification as Realism

The strategic lesson of Mauritius' import dependence is not that substitution is impossible, but that it is bounded. Certain categories lend themselves to partial localisation; others are structurally resistant under current and foreseeable constraints. Diversification, rather than autarky, emerges as the realistic objective. This includes diversifying suppliers to reduce concentration risk, transport routes to limit logistical exposure, energy sources where technically feasible, and domestic value chains in categories where comparative advantage or natural protection (perishability, transport costs) exists.

Equally important is diversification of measurement and transparency. The absence of published, longitudinal data on import composition trends, substitution outcomes, domestic production replacing imports, and supply-chain resilience is itself a vulnerability. It limits institutional learning, prevents rigorous evaluation of policy effectiveness, and obscures accountability. Statistics Mauritius should publish an annual Import Dependence and Substitution Report detailing food self-sufficiency ratios by major categories, energy import percentages updated quarterly, partner concentration trends, and progress metrics for targeted substitution initiatives. The cost would be modest—perhaps $50,000 to $200,000 annually for data compilation and publication—but the value in improved decision-making and public accountability would far exceed it.

Import management should be framed as risk mitigation, not nationalist industrial policy. Its objective is reduced fragility: wider margins, more buffers, greater optionality when shocks arrive. This requires coordination across traditionally separate policy domains—agricultural support must consider food security and foreign exchange effects; energy policy must align with external balance objectives; trade negotiations must prioritise supplier diversification not just market access; climate adaptation investments should incorporate import substitution where synergies exist (renewable energy serves both mitigation and import reduction).

Section 38 therefore establishes a critical boundary condition for the outlook that follows. Mauritius' economic resilience will not be determined by eliminating imports—an impossible and undesirable goal for a small open economy—but by managing dependence intelligently: reducing exposure where feasible through targeted substitution in fresh food, renewable energy, and niche manufacturing; diversifying suppliers and logistics routes where domestic production is unviable; building strategic reserves for critical commodities; and constructing the statistical infrastructure to measure vulnerability and track mitigation credibly. This understanding provides the analytical bridge to subsequent sections on ocean-based value creation, energy security pathways, and constrained entrepreneurship—domains where domestic capacity development intersects with external dependencies in ways that will shape Mauritius' trajectory through 2029.