China Lends. Russia Sends Soldiers. The Gulf Buys the Asset.
Four external powers are said to be bidding against each other for the Global South. They are not offering the same thing, they do not want the same thing in return, and the sums involved are smaller than almost anyone assumes. In 2024, China signed six sovereign loans in Africa worth just under 2.1 billion dollars. African governments raise more than that from their own taxpayers every two days.
Port Louis, Mauritius · Photograph by Z. Dilloo for The Meridian
The phrase "bidding war" carries an assumption worth examining: that there is one auction, four bidders, and a single currency of exchange. On that reading a government in Bamako or Dhaka or Lusaka sits at the centre of a competitive market and takes the best offer.
The published figures do not describe that market. They describe four powers doing four different things, wanting four different things back, and operating at a scale that is dwarfed by money nobody is competing over at all.
Two things in that chart are usually reported the other way round. The European Union, which is widely described as having lost Africa to China, trades more with the continent than China does. And Russia, which is described as having returned to Africa in force, trades less with all fifty-four African countries than India does with them in four months.
More than seventy per cent of Russia's African trade is with four countries: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa. Africa is about 3.9 per cent of Russia's foreign trade. Its exports to Africa are grain, fertiliser, refined fuel and weapons, and it imports almost nothing back.
This is the single most under-reported shift in the relationship, and it undercuts the premise of a bidding war more than any other fact in this article.
Boston University's Global Development Policy Center maintains the authoritative database of Chinese loans to Africa. Over 2000 to 2024 it records 1,319 loan commitments worth 180.87 billion dollars, signed by 42 Chinese lenders with 49 African governments and seven regional institutions. That is an average of about 7.2 billion dollars a year across the quarter century.
In 2024, Chinese lenders signed six loans across the entire African continent, worth just under 2.1 billion dollars. Angola took 1.45 billion of it, for power transmission and roads. Fossil fuel projects, power generation and information technology received no new sovereign loans at all. One energy loan was confirmed in the whole year.
The money has not left. It has changed instrument. Renewable energy and critical minerals that would once have arrived as a sovereign loan now arrive as equity in a project company, and China became the largest source of greenfield capital in Africa in 2025.
That matters for the recipient in a way that is easy to miss. A loan creates a debt the government owes and an asset the government owns. Equity creates no debt and no asset. The lender who becomes an owner has swapped a claim on the treasury for a claim on the mine.
A loan leaves the government owning a road. Equity leaves the investor owning the mine.
Where China does still lend, the structure has tightened. In 2024 every one of its infrastructure loans to Kenya was denominated in renminbi, and Kenya converted existing dollar railway debt into renminbi in 2025. In June 2026 the People's Bank of China authorised Standard Bank and ICBC to act jointly as a renminbi clearing bank covering nineteen African countries. The currency of the relationship is being changed deliberately.
Russia's offer is security, and the striking thing is how it is settled.
The Africa Corps, which absorbed Wagner's operations under the Russian defence ministry, is deployed in the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea and Niger. C4ADS tracked 75 military transport flights into the Sahel between January 2025 and July 2026. In the Central African Republic, payment runs through resource concessions to affiliated entities, including the Ndassima gold mine, a diamond company and a timber company, all named in American, British and European sanctions designations. In Mali, reporting puts it closer to a cash retainer paid from the national budget alongside mining and refinery agreements.
What Russia is not doing is lending. It holds nuclear cooperation agreements with fifteen African countries, but only one is financed: Egypt's El-Dabaa plant, four reactors backed by a 25 billion dollar Russian state export loan covering 85 per cent of the cost at 3 per cent. The agreements signed with Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Ethiopia in 2024 and 2025 are memoranda at pre-feasibility stage with no disbursed financing attached to them.
Even the weapons are constrained. Russia's global arms exports fell 64 per cent between the 2016 to 2020 and 2021 to 2025 windows. Its share of African major arms imports is now 15 per cent, behind both the United States and China, from a position of continental dominance in earlier periods. Rosoboronexport's African order book stands at around 4 billion dollars, which it cannot fill while domestic war production has first call.
Russia has signed, on one account, nearly 150 military contracts with 46 African countries since 2023 worth over 20 billion dollars. The order book and the delivery record are different documents.
The Gulf is the only one of the four whose flows are large, verifiable and growing, and its instrument is ownership.
The United Arab Emirates disbursed 35 billion dollars into Egypt in the first half of 2024 for the Ras El-Hekma coastal development, 24 billion in fresh cash and 11 billion converted from an existing central bank deposit. Qatar disbursed 3.5 billion in 2025, which Cairo applied to reducing budget-sector debt. Both appear in Egypt's audited balance of payments in an IMF staff report, which is why they can be stated as disbursements rather than pledges.
Then the ports. DP World holds concessions at Berbera, Bosaso, Dakar, Maputo, Luanda, Dar es Salaam and Ain Sokhna, and terminals at Karachi and five Indian ports. AD Ports holds Pointe-Noire, Luanda, Safaga, Conakry and Karachi Gateway. Saudi Arabia's Red Sea Gateway Terminal operates Patenga in Chittagong. These are thirty- and fifty-year contracts over the infrastructure through which other people's trade must pass.
And then there is the gold, which is the part of this story that deserves to be far better known than it is.
Read the first two bars together. African gold leaves without being recorded, arrives in Dubai, and a substantial tonnage then moves on to Swiss refineries. The destination for the continent's artisanal gold is not a mystery and neither is the route. What the Gulf offers, in this part of the trade, is a market that does not require the metal to have been declared where it came out of the ground.
This is also what makes Article 17's finding in this edition hold together. Three Sahel states earn most of their foreign exchange from gold, are required by law to surrender their dollar receipts to a central bank in Dakar, and sit next to a buyer that will take the metal without the paperwork. The incentive that creates does not need spelling out.
India's terms are the cheapest of the four and the most explicitly conditional, and it publishes both facts itself.
Its export bank has extended, on the foreign ministry's count, 196 credit lines worth 12 billion dollars to 42 African countries. The summit secretariat gives 190 lines and over 10 billion. The bank's own project ledger gives 308 projects worth 8.9 billion across 39 countries. The three numbers differ because they count different stages, and the figure that matters is the fourth: 4.5 billion dollars of projects completed, under half of what has been committed.
The condition is statutory rather than implied. Under India's own guidelines, at least 75 per cent of the contract value of goods and services under these credit lines must be sourced from India, relaxable to 65 per cent for civil construction, with bidding restricted to Indian companies. A concessional loan at 1.5 per cent that must be spent on Indian equipment is a subsidy to Indian exporters as much as a transfer to the borrower, and India does not pretend otherwise.
What it also supplies is harder to price. India accounts for roughly a fifth of the global generic medicines market by volume, and Africa took about 12.9 per cent of its pharmaceutical exports in the year to March 2025, around 3.93 billion dollars. It has trained 37,000 African professionals under its technical cooperation programme and educated over 42,000 African students. Those are not geopolitical instruments in any obvious sense, and they are probably the most consequential thing on this entire list.
That table is the clearest answer to the question the article's title raises. These are not four bidders in one auction. They are four different products, and the market for them is segmented by what the borrower is willing to give up.
China's price is a vote and a principle. Research cited by AidData, using half a century of General Assembly roll-call data, finds that a ten per cent increase in a developing country's voting alignment with China is associated with a 276 per cent increase in Chinese aid and credit commitments. Fifty-three of fifty-four African states adhere to the One China principle. China also operates exactly one overseas military base, at Djibouti.
Russia's price is a vote of a narrower kind and a place to land aircraft. Every African state hosting Africa Corps personnel has voted against or abstained on General Assembly resolutions condemning the invasion of Ukraine. Russia holds airbase, logistics or overflight access in Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and the Central African Republic.
The Gulf's price is the asset itself, on a thirty-year lease, with arbitration in London or Washington if the host government changes its mind. India's price is written into the contract at 75 per cent, and a hope of support for a permanent Security Council seat.
We looked for a single source that measures what these four provide on one consistent basis. There is not one, and the reason is instructive rather than technical.
China and India lend to sovereigns, so their money appears on public debt ledgers. The Gulf states deploy equity, concessions and central bank deposits, which appear in balance of payments financial accounts and not in sovereign debt at all. Russia operates through commercial sales and off-budget security-for-mining arrangements that appear in neither. Adding a multi-year announced commitment to an annual realised cash flow produces a number that means nothing. Anyone who presents you with a single league table of the four has built it out of incompatible series.
The finding underneath that chart matters more than the ranking. Afrobarometer reports that attitudes toward these powers are strongly correlated with one another: the same respondents who rate China positively tend to rate the United States and the European Union positively too. Africans are not choosing a camp. They want several partners at once, and seventy-two per cent of those aware of the war in Ukraine say their country should stay neutral.
A bidding war requires the buyer to pick one. The buyers have said, in a survey across thirty-eight countries, that they would rather not.
In November 2026 the World Bank published figures that should change how this subject is discussed.
Remittances to low- and middle-income countries outside China reached 687.1 billion dollars in 2025. Equity investment into the same group was 333.5 billion. Net transfers on long-term debt from every official and private creditor combined were 45.4 billion, and that was a good year: in 2024 the same measure was an outflow of 118.4 billion, and between 2022 and 2025 these countries paid 436 billion dollars more in debt service than they received in new money.
For Africa specifically, remittances run at roughly 90 to 95 billion dollars a year across the continent. Total bilateral aid from all thirty-four donor countries to Africa in 2025 was 29 billion. African governments raise somewhere between 480 and 550 billion dollars a year from their own taxpayers.
Set the 2.1 billion dollars China lent to African sovereigns in 2024 against that last figure. It is roughly what African states collect in domestic revenue in a day and a half.
There is no bidding war, and the phrase does real damage by implying one.
What exists is a segmented market in which each external power sells a different product on different terms to buyers who want all of them and are refusing to choose. China has shifted from lending to ownership, and its sovereign lending in 2024 was under a third of its own long-run average. Russia sells security and nuclear memoranda, is paid in gold concessions and cash, and trades less with Africa than the European Union does in a month. The Gulf is the only one buying at scale, and part of what it buys arrives undocumented. India charges the least, publishes its 75 per cent procurement rule openly, and has completed under half of what it has promised.
Set against the money that arrives without a sponsor, all four are small. The flows that actually finance these economies are domestic taxation, domestic bond markets, which now supply 40 to 60 per cent of public debt across low- and middle-income countries, and the diaspora.
That is not an argument for ignoring the four powers. Ownership of a port, a copper mine or a gold route matters in ways a dollar figure does not capture, and a thirty-year concession outlives the government that signed it. It is an argument for proportion. A government that organises its economic strategy around which external patron to court is optimising the small variable, and the Afrobarometer data suggests its citizens already understand that better than its diplomats do.
First, whether Chinese sovereign lending recovers in 2025 and 2026 or whether 2024 marks a permanent shift to equity. The next edition of the Boston University database is the single most informative document on this subject and it is published annually.
Second, how much of the FOCAC package of 360 billion renminbi for 2025 to 2027 is disbursed. Neither Chinese ministry publishes an audited ledger against it, and the absence is itself the fact.
Third, whether the Gulf's announced greenfield pledges in Africa, which run above 100 billion dollars since 2022 and are concentrated in green hydrogen, reach financial close. Outside the Egyptian disbursements and the closed mining and port acquisitions, almost none of it has been reconciled against money actually moved.
Fourth, the Russia-Africa action plan for 2027 to 2029, adopted in Moscow in October 2026 across nineteen sectors, and the stated target of 40 to 60 billion dollars in trade by 2030. That requires roughly doubling from 27.8 billion while Russian industry is on a war footing.
Fifth, and most consequential, remittance costs. A reduction of one percentage point in the average cost of sending money home is worth more to these economies than any announcement at any of these summits, and it is the one variable over which recipient governments have real leverage.
Data notes: Chinese loan commitments to Africa, including the 2024 figure of just under 2.1 billion dollars across six projects, the cumulative 180.87 billion across 1,319 commitments from 2000 to 2024, the Angolan share and the absence of new fossil fuel, power generation and information technology lending in 2024, are from the Boston University Global Development Policy Center's Chinese Loans to Africa Database, published 13 November 2025. The annual average of about 7.2 billion dollars is our own arithmetic on that cumulative total and is labelled as such in Chart 2; research supplied to this desk gave a 2016 peak of 28.8 billion and a 2023 figure of 4.61 billion, neither of which we could confirm from the database page, and neither is stated here. Chinese equity investment of 33.5 billion dollars in the first half of 2026 is from UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2026 as reported in secondary coverage of 14 November 2026, and is reported at one remove. Trade figures are from Financial Afrik of 30 October 2026, by Professor Abderrahmane Mebtoul, citing Russian and Chinese customs data, together with Indian Ministry of Commerce figures of May 2026; research supplied to this desk listed Tunisia among Russia's four main African partners, where the published account gives South Africa, and the published account is used. Africa Corps deployments, flight tracking and payment arrangements are from C4ADS, 12 August 2026, and from sanctions designations of November and December 2024. Arms transfer figures are from SIPRI's Trends in International Arms Transfers 2025, published 9 March 2026. Nuclear agreements are from the Energy for Growth Hub, 17 September 2026, and the PIR Center, 19 March 2026. Egyptian disbursements from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are from IMF Country Report 26/69 of March 2026. Gold figures are from SWISSAID's On the Trail of African Gold by Marc Ummel and Yvan Schulz, 30 May 2024, covering 2012 to 2022: the 2,596 tonnes imported into the United Arab Emirates without being declared for export at origin, the 1,670 tonnes imported into Switzerland from Dubai, and the 435 tonnes smuggled out of Africa in 2022 worth about 31 billion dollars. That study's own page gives the annual value of undeclared artisanal production as both 24 to 35 billion dollars and up to 32 billion Swiss francs without reconciling them, so no single value is stated here; research supplied to this desk also gave the United Arab Emirates a 47 per cent share of African gold exports and 80 to 85 per cent of artisanal gold, percentages we could not confirm from the study's page and have therefore omitted. Indian credit line figures, the divergence between the three official counts, the 4.5 billion dollars of completed projects and the statutory 75 per cent procurement requirement are from the Ministry of External Affairs of 2 February 2026, the summit secretariat of 19 May 2026 and the Export-Import Bank of India. Pharmaceutical and training figures are from Pharmexcil's Hand Book 2025 and the Embassy of India in Cairo. Lending terms are from the World Bank's International Debt Report 2026 and from AidData's Belt and Road Reboot of November 2023, including the finding that more than a third of Belt and Road infrastructure loans require borrower-funded foreign currency escrow. The General Assembly voting finding is from research cited in that AidData report. Survey figures are from Afrobarometer's African Insights 2026, covering Round 10 surveys across 38 African countries in 2024 and 2025; the report's page does not state a total sample size, and research supplied to this desk gave preferred development model rankings and a sample above 50,000 which we could not confirm there and have omitted. Remittance, equity, net debt transfer and debt service figures, the 2011 comparison and the 40 to 60 per cent domestic share of public debt are from the World Bank's International Debt Report 2026, published 5 November 2026. African domestic revenue of 480 to 550 billion dollars a year is an estimate drawn from IMF regional and fiscal publications rather than a single published figure, and is given as a range for that reason. Bilateral aid to Africa of 29 billion dollars in 2025 is from OECD document DCD(2026)8.
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