One Star: China’s Neighbours Leave a Review
Fourteen borders. Fourteen disputes. One country. The Meridian examines the most contested neighbourhood on earth, from the Himalayas to the South China Sea.
Good fences make good neighbours. China has no fences.
The American poet Robert Frost wrote those words in 1914. He was writing about New England stone walls and the unspoken agreements between adjacent farms. He could not have known that a century later, the line would serve as the most precise summary of Chinese foreign policy available in the English language.
China shares a land border with fourteen countries. It has active territorial disputes with the overwhelming majority of them. It has maritime disputes with five more. No other major power on earth has managed this. Not the United States, which has essentially no territorial disputes with Canada or Mexico. Not Russia, whose conflicts are geographically concentrated. Not India, which has disputes, but primarily because China is on the other side of them.
The pattern is not accidental. It is structural. And it tells us something important about how Beijing understands sovereignty, legitimacy, and the rules of the international order.
Before the analysis, however, the neighbours deserve to speak for themselves.
What do fourteen separate territorial disputes tell us about one country? Everything.
India and China have never agreed where their border lies. The Line of Actual Control (the operational boundary rather than a formally demarcated frontier) runs for 3,488 kilometres across terrain that shifts from desert to glacier to dense forest. It has never been drawn on a map that both governments have signed.
In 1962, China launched a war across that line. India lost badly. The territory China took, Aksai Chin in what India calls Ladakh, Beijing still administers. India still claims it. Neither position has changed in sixty-two years.
In June 2020, soldiers from both sides fought hand-to-hand in the Galwan Valley. No firearms were used (both sides had agreed not to carry them in the patrol zone), so men died with rocks, clubs, and their bare hands. Twenty Indian soldiers were killed. China acknowledged four deaths, a figure independent analysts have consistently disputed.
Arunachal Pradesh, a state of one and a half million people in northeast India, China calls South Tibet and claims as its own. India administers it. China objects to any Indian government official visiting it.
Bhutan, further along the range, has been engaged in border negotiations with China for decades. China has built villages inside territory that Bhutanese maps show as Bhutanese. Doklam, the plateau where Indian, Chinese, and Bhutanese territory converges, saw a seventy-three-day military standoff in 2017. The underlying claims were not resolved.
Nepal has seen credible reports of Chinese encroachment along the border: border pillars moved, villages absorbed, grazing land claimed. Nepal’s economic dependency on China makes formal protest difficult. The complaints exist primarily in Nepali civil society and local press.
The Senkaku Islands are five uninhabited islands and three rocks in the East China Sea. Japan administers them. China claims them. The United States, under its security treaty with Japan, has confirmed it would defend them if attacked. This means five uninhabited rocks carry within them the theoretical architecture of a war between three nuclear-armed powers.
China began regular patrols of the waters around the Senkakus in 2012. The patrols have continued every year since. The diplomatic language has not improved.
Taiwan requires a separate category. China does not dispute Taiwan’s border. China disputes Taiwan’s existence as a political entity. The People’s Republic has never governed Taiwan. The Republic of China, the government that retreated there in 1949 after losing the civil war, has governed it continuously since. Taiwan has held direct presidential elections since 1996. Its GDP per capita exceeds that of several European Union members. Its semiconductor industry produces the chips on which the entire global technology economy depends.
Beijing’s position is that Taiwan is a province of China, that reunification is inevitable, and that military force remains an option to achieve it. That position has not changed under any Chinese leadership since 1949.
“Five uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea carry within them the theoretical architecture of a war between three nuclear-armed powers. The diplomatic language has not improved since 2012.”
Here, the scale of China’s territorial ambition becomes fully legible.
The nine-dash line is a U-shaped claim drawn around approximately ninety per cent of the South China Sea. It encompasses waters that Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia all claim under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It has no basis in international law. The historical evidence China has offered to support it has been reviewed by legal scholars and found wanting.
In 2016, the Philippines brought a case before an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS. The tribunal ruled comprehensively in the Philippines’ favour. China declared the ruling null and void and refused to implement it. The ruling remains on the books. The Chinese coast guard remains in the waters.
China has built artificial islands on submerged reefs and sandbanks in the Spratly archipelago, constructing runways, hangars, radar installations, and anti-aircraft batteries on structures that did not exist twenty years ago. This is not a dispute about where a line falls. It is the construction of military infrastructure in waters that international law assigns to other states.
Vietnam lost the Paracel Islands to China by force in 1974, while Saigon was falling and Washington was otherwise occupied. China administers them now. The administrative seat is a city called Sansha, established in 2012.
Russia is the exception, but only for now.
The 1969 Sino-Soviet border war was a real shooting conflict. Soviet and Chinese soldiers died on the Ussuri River. The nuclear threat was not abstract: Soviet military planners discussed a pre-emptive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities. The crisis passed. The border was eventually demarcated.
Today, Moscow and Beijing present themselves as strategic partners without limits. The logic is clear: both face Western pressure, both benefit from the other’s market and military posture.
But Chinese nationalist memory is longer than the partnership. The treaties of Aigun in 1858 and Peking in 1860 transferred approximately 1.5 million square kilometres of territory from the Qing Empire to the Russian Empire. Chinese school curricula classify these as unequal treaties, the same category as the agreements that ceded Hong Kong to Britain. The official position is that the matter is settled. The historical memory is not. What China does with that memory when the partnership no longer serves it is a question the Russian government has not publicly answered.
Beijing does not describe any of this as expansion. The official position on every dispute is recovery: territory unjustly taken during the century of humiliation, from the Opium War to the Communist victory in 1949, now being reassembled. The South China Sea was always Chinese. Tibet was always Chinese. Taiwan was always Chinese. The border with India was always where China says it was.
This framing is strategically important because it is not entirely fictitious. China was carved apart by imperial powers. The unequal treaties were real. The humiliation was real. And a country that understands its territorial claims as restoration rather than conquest is a country that cannot be argued out of them by reference to international norms it regards as a Western imposition.
The problem is that the same logic, applied consistently, would unsettle borders across the entire Global South. Every colonial-era boundary was drawn without the consent of the people on both sides of it. If historical grievance overrides treaty law, the international order has no floor.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has ten members. Five of them have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. ASEAN operates by consensus. China has used its economic relationships with Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (countries without South China Sea claims) to block consensus statements that name Chinese behaviour directly.
The 2012 ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh ended without a joint communiqué for the first time in the organisation’s history. Cambodia held the chair. The sentence that could not be agreed was a reference to recent incidents in the South China Sea.
This is how China manages its neighbourhood at the multilateral level: not by force in every instance, but by ensuring that the institutions designed to constrain it cannot function.
Each active dispute scored on three dimensions: Escalation Risk (1–10), Legal Resolution Prospect (1–10, where 10 = high prospect), and Current Trajectory.
| Neighbour | Core Dispute | Escalation Risk | Legal Prospect | Trajectory |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| India | LAC / Aksai Chin / Arunachal Pradesh | 8/10 | 2/10 | Static |
| Japan | Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands | 6/10 | 3/10 | Deteriorating |
| Taiwan | Sovereignty | 9/10 | 1/10 | Deteriorating |
| Philippines | South China Sea / Scarborough Shoal | 7/10 | 2/10 | Deteriorating |
| Vietnam | Paracels / Spratlys | 6/10 | 2/10 | Static |
| Malaysia | Spratlys / nine-dash line | 4/10 | 3/10 | Static |
| Indonesia | Natuna Islands EEZ | 4/10 | 4/10 | Static |
| Bhutan | Doklam / border encroachment | 5/10 | 3/10 | Deteriorating |
| Nepal | Border encroachment | 3/10 | 4/10 | Deteriorating |
| Russia | Latent historical grievance | 2/10 | 6/10 | Static, for now |
Robert Frost’s neighbour in the poem argues that good fences are unnecessary. That something in nature does not love a wall. Frost’s farmer insists on the fence anyway. He cannot say exactly why. Only that his father said it, and his father before him.
Good fences make good neighbours.
China’s neighbours would settle for a fence. They would settle for a line, agreed and signed, that both sides would honour. What they have instead is a coast guard vessel in their waters, a village in their pasture, a runway on their reef, and an aircraft in their air defence zone at two in the morning.
One star. Would not recommend.
- UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award (12 July 2016). The tribunal ruled comprehensively in the Philippines’ favour on the nine-dash line and island-building claims. China rejected the award as null and void and has not implemented it.
- UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971. Recognised the People’s Republic of China as “the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations.” Explicitly leaves the question of Taiwan’s legal status unaddressed.
- Indian Ministry of Defence, statement on Galwan Valley clash, June 2020. Confirmed 20 Indian fatalities. China’s state-run Global Times acknowledged four PLA deaths on 19 February 2021, nine months after the incident. Independent assessments including CSIS satellite imagery analysis have disputed the Chinese figure.
- Treaty of Aigun (28 May 1858) and Convention of Peking (18 October 1860). Transferred approximately 1.5 million km² from the Qing Empire to the Russian Empire. Classified in the Chinese national curriculum as “unequal treaties” alongside the Treaty of Nanking and the Convention of Peking (Anglo-French).
- ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, July 2012. First summit in the association’s forty-five-year history to end without a joint communiqué. Cambodia blocked inclusion of South China Sea language at China’s request. Documented in ASEAN Secretariat records and contemporaneous reporting by Reuters and the Financial Times.
- CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (amti.csis.org). Satellite imagery database tracking Chinese island-construction on Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs in the Spratly archipelago. Runway, hangar, radar, and anti-aircraft installations catalogued from 2014 to present.
- Congressional Research Service, “China’s Actions in South and East China Seas” (R42784, updated 2024). Legislative background on UNCLOS claims, freedom-of-navigation operations, and US security commitments under the US–Japan Security Treaty, Article V.
- Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. 96-8, 1 January 1979. Obliges the United States to maintain Taiwan’s capacity for self-defence. Explicitly avoids formal recognition of either the PRC’s claim or the ROC’s.
- Doklam standoff, June–August 2017. Seventy-three-day military standoff at the India–China–Bhutan trijunction. Indian Ministry of External Affairs press statements. Standoff ended with mutual disengagement; underlying claims remained unresolved.
- Sino-Soviet border conflict, Ussuri River, March 1969. Chinese and Soviet forces exchanged fire on Zhenbao/Damansky Island. Soviet military planners considered pre-emptive strikes on Chinese nuclear facilities at Lop Nur. Documented in Soviet archives and Kissinger’s memoirs (White House Years, 1979).
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