Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger Left ECOWAS. Not the Franc.

Section IV · The Wars and the Powers · The World in 2027

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger Left ECOWAS. Not the Franc.

They quit the bloc on 29 January 2025. The central bank's own website still lists all three as members of the monetary union, and no legal act of withdrawal has been filed. Their gold is sold in dollars, surrendered to a pool in Dakar, and exchanged for a currency fixed to the euro. Mali has tried leaving before.

A money changer counting banknotes at a West African market table, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger Left ECOWAS. Not the Franc, The Meridian

The Central Bank of West African States publishes a page describing its membership. It reads that the monetary union currently comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Eight states, three of which left the Economic Community of West African States almost two years ago.

That is not an oversight. None of the three has served notice of denunciation under the monetary union treaty. In October 2025, when a forged communique circulated claiming the Alliance of Sahel States had decided to leave the CFA franc, the Presidency of Burkina Faso issued a denial. The confederation has since built a joint military force, a confederal parliament, a 0.5 per cent import levy and a development bank capitalised at 500 billion CFA francs. The bank is capitalised in CFA francs.

So the political exit is complete and the monetary one has not begun. The question this article asks is whether it should, and the answer the evidence gives is less comfortable than either side of the argument would like.

What the Arrangement Is

The West African CFA franc has been fixed at 655.957 to the euro since 1 January 1999. The French Treasury guarantees convertibility at that rate, without limit and without condition.

Three things about that guarantee are commonly misstated, so they are worth setting out. France no longer holds half the central bank's reserves: the operations account at the French Treasury was closed under the December 2019 Abidjan agreement, ratified in French law in March 2021, and the bank has managed 100 per cent of its own reserves since. France holds no seat on the bank's board, its monetary policy committee or the banking commission. And the French parliamentary reports on the 2019 reform state plainly that membership of the union and the choice of currency are sovereign decisions of the African states.

What remains is the peg itself, and the terms on which the guarantee can be called. It now operates as an emergency euro cash advance, triggered only if the central bank approaches exhaustion of its own reserves, and sustained use carries IMF programme conditionality. That is a narrower arrangement than the critics describe and a more consequential one than the defenders imply.

What It Has Delivered
Chart 1 · Three Monetary Regimes
The peg buys an eleven point lower policy rate. Ghana shows a float can still get inflation to three per cent.
 
WAEMU
Ghana
Nigeria
Regime
Fixed to the euro
Floating
Floating
Inflation 2025
0.0%
Falling
15.5% in Dec
Inflation 2026
2.1% projected
3.2% Mar, 5.5% Oct
12.9% projected
Policy rate
3.00%
14.00%
Double digit
Currency 2026
Unchanged
Down about 10%
Depreciating
WAEMU inflation is the union average; the 2026 figure is the central bank's October projection against a 1 to 3 per cent target band. Ghana's October 2026 reading of 5.5 per cent was its highest in eleven months, following 3.2 per cent in March, the lowest since 2021, against a 6 to 10 per cent target band. Nigeria's December 2025 figure was 15.5 per cent on the published series, with its central bank projecting an average near 12.9 per cent for 2026. Sources: BCEAO Monetary Policy Report, September 2026; Nairametrics, 4 November 2026; Daily Trust, 5 February 2026.

The first column is the case for the peg, stated as fairly as we can state it. Zero inflation across the union in 2025, a policy rate of 3.00 per cent, and no exchange rate to defend. Governments in the union borrow on the regional market at rates no floating West African sovereign can approach.

On 6 November 2026, Standard and Poor's raised Burkina Faso's long-term sovereign rating to B minus from CCC plus. Among its reasons was continued access to the pooled foreign exchange reserves the central bank manages, and it stated that it does not expect the country to leave the union. A ratings agency has priced membership as a credit strength, in writing, a week before this article.

The second and third columns are where the standard defence weakens. Ghana floats, and in March 2026 its inflation reached 3.2 per cent, the lowest since 2021. The claim that a floating West African currency means permanent double-digit inflation is no longer supportable. What it cost Ghana was a policy rate of 14 per cent, held since March, and a cedi down about a tenth against the dollar over the year. That is the honest exchange. Monetary sovereignty is available, and it costs roughly eleven percentage points on the price of money.

What the Peg Has Not Delivered to Niger

Union averages conceal a great deal. Niger is landlocked, imports most of its food, and had its border with Benin closed for much of the period. Inside a fixed exchange rate, its prices have behaved like this.

Chart 2 · Niger Inside the Peg
An eighteen point swing in twelve months, with the exchange rate never moving.
2024, annual average+9.1%
2025, annual average-4.7%
End 2025-9.4%
2026, projected average-1.9%
End 2026, projected+8.9%
Headline consumer price inflation, per cent
Niger's inflation went from minus 9.4 per cent at end 2025 to a projected plus 8.9 per cent at end 2026, a swing of over eighteen percentage points, under a fixed exchange rate throughout. Source: IMF Press Release 26/270, 29 July 2026, Table 1, and Country Report 25/205.

A fixed exchange rate does not stabilise prices in an economy where the shock arrives through a closed border and a harvest rather than through the currency. It stabilises the union's average. Niger is the clearest demonstration in the union that these are not the same thing.

Sold in Dollars, Banked in Euros

Here is the structural mismatch, and it is the strongest version of the case for change.

Chart 3 · One Commodity Each
Each of the three depends on a single export, and all three are priced in dollars.
Burkina Faso, gold90%
Mali, gold80%
Niger, crude oil55%
Share of merchandise exports. Burkina Faso's gold share is Standard and Poor's figure for 2025; Mali's is the lower bound of the IMF's 80 to 85 per cent range; Niger's crude share is the lower bound of a 50 to 60 per cent range following the opening of the pipeline to Benin. Gold is priced against the London dollar benchmark and crude against dollar crude benchmarks. Sources: S&P, 6 November 2026; IMF Country Report 26/165; IMF Press Release 26/270.

Now add the mechanism that connects those dollars to a euro peg. Under union foreign exchange regulations, every resident exporter in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger is legally required to repatriate 100 per cent of its dollar and euro export proceeds through a commercial bank in the union and surrender them to the central bank in exchange for CFA francs, within 120 days of shipment. That surrender is the principal mechanism by which the pooled reserves are replenished.

It has worked, spectacularly, and the gold boom in the Sahel is why.

Chart 4 · The Reserve Rebuild
Pooled reserves tripled in sixteen months. No country's individual share is published.
February 202645.8
October 202414.5
Billions of US dollars of gross pooled reserves at the Central Bank of West African States. The February 2026 figure covers 7.8 months of prospective imports against an IMF adequacy benchmark of five. Burkina Faso's gold output reached 90.7 tonnes in 2025 against a 2022 to 2024 average of 58.8 tonnes. Reserves are pooled at union level under the bank's statutes, and neither the bank nor the IMF publishes a breakdown attributing any part of the stock to Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger individually. Sources: IMF Country Report 26/154; BCEAO Annual Report 2025; S&P, 6 November 2026.

The Sahel's gold helped triple the union's reserves. There is no published figure for how much of that stock the Sahel could claim.

That is not a conspiracy. It is how a reserve pool works, and pooling is the thing that makes the peg defensible. But it does mean that a state contemplating departure cannot find out, from any published source, what it would be leaving with.

Mali Has Done This Before

It is unusual for a policy debate to have a controlled experiment conducted in the same country. This one does.

On 1 July 1962 Mali left the franc zone and introduced the Malian franc at par with the CFA franc. On 5 May 1967, five years later, it was devalued by 50 per cent, because inflation in Mali had run ahead of inflation in the CFA states. On 1 June 1984 Mali readopted the CFA franc at two Malian francs to one.

Chart 5 · The Malian Franc, 1962 to 1984
Mali left at parity and came back, twenty-two years later, at half the rate.
1 July 1962, launch1.00
5 May 1967, devalued0.50
1 June 1984, return0.50
Value of one Malian franc in CFA francs. The 1967 devaluation was never reversed; Mali rejoined at the post-devaluation rate of two Malian francs to one CFA franc. Sources: monetary histories of the Malian franc; the central bank's own History of the West African Monetary Union, Volume II, records the 1962 settlement.

The settlement terms are the part worth knowing. The central bank's own history records that withdrawal is settled by a transfer and liquidation agreement based on the balance sheet of its national agency in the departing state. Currency in circulation and bank deposits held at the national branches are liabilities the new central bank assumes. Against those, the bank's domestic credit claims on the departing state's treasury and banks are deducted. Only if external assets attributable to the national agency exceed those domestic liabilities does the departing state receive a net transfer of reserves.

In Mali in 1962, central bank credit to the state and to local banks exceeded external assets. Mali left with nothing.

What Leaving Would Require Now
Chart 6 · The Build
Five systems currently provided at union level would have to be replaced.
 
Provided now at union level
Must be built
Law
Union treaty and uniform banking and foreign exchange law
A central bank organic law, legal tender, a policy mandate, a foreign exchange code
Reserves
Pooled, 7.8 months of imports, with an unlimited euro guarantee
Own reserves of at least three to five months, and correspondent banking with no backstop
Payments
Regional settlement, clearing, instant payments, card switch and a bond depository
National equivalents of all five, and redenomination of outstanding regional debt
Notes
Unified notes issued centrally, carrying national code letters
Printing, minting, distribution across landlocked territory, a synchronised exchange
Supervision
A supranational banking commission and capital markets regulator
National supervision and deposit insurance for banks spanning both blocs
Sources: BCEAO Annual Report 2025, pages 57 to 63; IMF Selected Issues Paper 2024/013; IMF Country Report 26/154.

Note the fourth row. The union's banknotes already carry a national identifying letter, D for Mali, C for Burkina Faso and H for Niger. The physical groundwork for separating the currencies exists, which is the one piece of this that is easier than it looks.

Note also what a departing state would be redenominating. None of the three has ever issued an international bond. All three borrow on the regional market in CFA francs, from banks in Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Benin and Togo. Burkina Faso raised 60 per cent of its debt there by mid-2026, up from 48 per cent. Leaving the currency means telling those creditors what their claims are now worth.

The Argument, Properly Put

The case against the peg is made most rigorously by Kako Nubukpo, a former WAEMU commissioner and former official of the central bank itself, and by Ndongo Samba Sylla and Fanny Pigeaud. Their mechanisms are specific. A euro peg managed for low-inflation industrial economies produces periodic real exchange rate overvaluation in commodity exporters, penalising anything they try to export other than raw material. A one to three per cent inflation target and high reserve requirements ration credit to domestic firms. The prohibition on central bank financing of budgets, combined with a three per cent deficit ceiling, forces governments to borrow at market rates rather than fund development in their own currency. Nubukpo's own proposal is not a free float but a regional currency pegged to a basket of the euro, the dollar and the renminbi, with wider bands.

The case for the arrangement rests on the first column of Chart 1 and on a trade-off Devarajan and Rodrik quantified for the World Bank in 1991: franc zone members achieved substantially lower inflation than comparable African economies, at a measurable output cost during severe terms-of-trade shocks when devaluation was unavailable. That is not a defence of the peg in all conditions. It is a statement of what is bought and what is paid.

Both sides agree on the mechanism. The peg delivers low inflation and convertibility by surrendering the exchange rate and the printing press. The disagreement is about which matters more, and that is a political question, not an econometric one.

What We Conclude

The case for monetary sovereignty in the Sahel is stronger than its critics allow and the case for doing it now is weaker than its advocates allow, and both of those follow from the same evidence.

Stronger, because the mismatch is real and documented. Three states earn 55 to 90 per cent of their export income in dollars, surrender all of it by law within 120 days, and receive a currency fixed to the euro. Their shocks arrive through closed borders, harvests and commodity prices that have nothing to do with the European Central Bank's reaction function. Niger's inflation swung eighteen points in a year inside a fixed exchange rate, which is the most direct available refutation of the claim that the peg delivers price stability to its weakest members. And Ghana has now demonstrated that a West African float can reach 3.2 per cent inflation, which removes the strongest empirical card the peg's defenders held.

Weaker, because of what the exit costs and who has done the arithmetic. Eleven percentage points on the policy rate is the observable price of Ghana's sovereignty. Mali tried this and devalued by half within five years, then spent twenty-two years outside before returning at the devalued rate, and the central bank's own settlement rules meant it left with no reserves at all. The reserve pool it would be leaving today has no published country shares, so no finance ministry in Bamako, Ouagadougou or Niamey can currently state what it would walk away with. And a week ago a ratings agency upgraded one of the three partly because it had stayed.

What the evidence supports is not exit and not the status quo. It is the thing none of the three has yet done: commission and publish the work. The reserve attribution, the redenomination of regional debt, the payments build, the sequencing. Nubukpo's basket peg is a serious proposal that has never been costed by a government that might adopt it. The AES has built a parliament, an army and a bank in twenty-three months. It has not published a monetary feasibility study.

A currency is not a flag. The three states have proved they can act fast on sovereignty when they choose to. On the one decision that would actually change the terms on which their gold is sold, they have moved more slowly than on any other, and the most likely reason is that the people doing the arithmetic have seen what Chart 5 and Chart 6 contain.

What to Watch

First, whether any of the three files a notice of denunciation. That is the only act that starts the clock, and until one is filed every statement about a new currency is an intention rather than a process.

Second, whether the ECOWAS eco launches. The bloc reaffirmed 2027 as its target in July 2026, with a multi-speed start among states that meet the convergence criteria, and instructed central bank governors to convene before its December 2026 summit. The three AES states are outside that track. If the eco launches and works, the argument changes; if it slips again, as it has repeatedly, that tells you something about how hard new currencies are.

Third, Burkina Faso's IMF programme, which expires in September 2027 with its final reviews falling due during the year, and Niger's, which concludes at end 2026. A state intending to leave a monetary union does not usually choose the same window to negotiate a successor arrangement with the Fund.

Fourth, the gold price, which is a single world price quoted against the dollar and not a regional one. Gold reached 5,589 dollars an ounce on 28 January 2026 and closed at 4,070 on 6 November, roughly 27 per cent below that peak. Standard and Poor's assumes a global average of 4,300 dollars in 2026, 4,000 in 2027 and 3,500 in 2028, which sits well below the major banks: Goldman Sachs cut its end-2027 target to 4,800 dollars on 5 November, and JP Morgan, UBS, Wells Fargo and Bank of America were all above that figure.

Two things follow, and they point in opposite directions. Burkina Faso's upgrade was granted on a deliberately conservative gold path, which makes the rating more robust rather than less. And the current account surpluses, the reserve rebuild and the fiscal consolidation across all three states rest on a metal that has already lost a quarter of its value since January. A further fall would test the peg and the case against it at the same time, and would settle more of this argument than any communique.

Data notes: The list of monetary union members is as published on the Central Bank of West African States website at the time of writing, which lists all eight states including Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The effective date of ECOWAS withdrawal, 29 January 2025, follows the one-year notice period under Article 91 of the revised ECOWAS treaty and is recorded in IMF Country Report 25/205. The absence of any notice of denunciation under the monetary union treaty, and the October 2025 denial by the Presidency of Burkina Faso of a forged communique claiming a CFA franc exit, are from the research supplied to this desk; we were able to confirm continuing membership from the central bank's own site and from Standard and Poor's rating rationale of 6 November 2026, but not the denial itself from the Burkinabe presidency directly, and it is reported here as the attributed account rather than as verified. The parity of 655.957 to the euro, the closure of the operations account, the conversion of the guarantee to a stand-by euro advance and the withdrawal of France from the central bank's governing bodies are from the Banque de France and from the French Senate and National Assembly reports on the ratification of the 2019 Abidjan agreement. WAEMU inflation, the 3.00 per cent policy rate and reserve figures are from the BCEAO Monetary Policy Report of September 2026, the BCEAO Annual Report 2025 and IMF Country Report 26/154; the end-2025 reserve figure appears as both 7.0 and 7.4 months of import cover in two IMF reports and we have used the February 2026 figure of 7.8 months instead. Ghana's inflation path and 14 per cent policy rate are from Nairametrics, 4 November 2026, and Daily Trust, 5 February 2026; the research supplied to this desk gave Ghanaian inflation as 14.2 per cent, which is substantially out of date, and the current readings are used. Nigeria's December 2025 figure is given on the published series, with a methodological adjustment to 17.33 per cent reported but not explained by the source, and is reported here with that caveat. Niger's inflation series is from IMF Press Release 26/270 of 29 July 2026 and Country Report 25/205. Burkina Faso's rating upgrade, its 90 per cent gold export share, 90.7 tonnes of output, 60 per cent regional borrowing share and the gold price assumptions are from Standard and Poor's as reported on 6 and 7 November 2026. The mandatory 120-day repatriation and surrender requirement is recorded in the BCEAO Annual Report 2025. The Malian franc's launch at par on 1 July 1962, its 50 per cent devaluation on 5 May 1967 and the return to the CFA franc at two to one on 1 June 1984 are from published monetary histories; the 1962 settlement in which Mali departed without net reserves is recorded in the central bank's own History of the West African Monetary Union, Volume II, as cited in the research supplied to this desk. Gold is quoted as a single world price against the dollar, so the price assumptions cited are global and not specific to these three states. The peak of 5,589 dollars an ounce on 28 January 2026 and the close of 4,070 on 6 November 2026 are as reported by market sources, and the bank forecasts, including Goldman Sachs's reduction of its end-2027 target to 4,800 dollars on 5 November 2026, are from TheStreet, citing MarketWatch. The institutional requirements for exit are drawn from the BCEAO Annual Report 2025 and IMF Selected Issues Paper 2024/013. The critical case is attributed to the published work of Kako Nubukpo, Ndongo Samba Sylla and Fanny Pigeaud, and the trade-off finding to Devarajan and Rodrik, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 777, 1991. No national elections are scheduled in any of the three states in 2027.

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